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The Economic Research department’s mission is to cater to the economic research needs of the clients, business lines and functions of BNP Paribas. Our team of economists and statisticians covers a large number of advanced, developing and emerging countries, the real economy, financial markets and banking. As we foster the sharing of our research output with anyone who is interested in the economic situation or who needs insight into specific economic issues, this website presents our analysis, videos and podcasts.
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On 16 June, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) extended its temporary swap agreements through 31 December 2021*. This facility, which offers foreign central banks the possibility of obtaining dollars from the Fed and then lending them to local commercial banks, is not being drawn on much today, but it did help alleviate global pressures on the USD liquidity due to the Covid-19 shock. These swap agreements had already been set up during the 2008 financial crisis, albeit in a distorted manner, since they were largely used as a substitute for the discount window. In the end, most of the liquidity lent by the Fed as part of these swap agreements was lent out again to the US branches of foreign banks to counter the abrupt drying up of the USD short-term debt market
In the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, bank deposits, which represent the main component of broad money, have seen extremely rapid growth in both the eurozone and the USA. The origins of this newly created money have frequently been imperfectly identified, and the same goes for the possible factors for its destruction. The European methodology for monitoring money supply nevertheless offers a valuable basis for analysis. In this article we will apply this to US data. We learn that between them, the amplification of the Federal Reserve’s securities purchasing programme and the Treasury-guaranteed loan scheme to companies are sufficient to explain the rapid rise in the rate of growth in bank deposits
On 17 March, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) raised the ceiling on transactions under its Reverse Repo Program (RRP). Each eligible counterparty* can now take, on each trading day, up to USD 80 billion in Treasuries held by the Fed on repo, from a limit of USD30 billion previously. Introduced in the autumn of 2013, one year before the ending of QE3 (the Fed’s third quantitative easing programme) and two years before the beginning of the post-crisis monetary tightening, this facility saw high levels of participation by money market funds (with interest rates of between 0.01% and 0.07% up to the end of 2015) and helped establish a floor for short-term market interest rates
Since March 2020, exceptional measures to bolster liquidity have resulted in a significant expansion of banks’ balance sheets. Fearing that leverage requirements could hamper the transmission of monetary policy and affect banks’ abilities to lend to the economy, the authorities have temporarily relaxed such requirements in the US (until 31 March) and in the eurozone (until 27 June). In the US, although the temporary exclusion of reserves and Treasuries from leverage exposure (the denominator of the Basel ratio) is automatic for large bank holding companies, it is optional for their depository institution subsidiaries. The latter can only make use of the exclusion if they submit their dividend payment plans (including intra-group dividends) for supervisory approval
The US mortgage market – the epicentre of the 2007-2008 financial crisis – has yet to be reformed. Nearly half of the USD 10,000 billion in housing loans are guaranteed by the Federal government via two private agencies (GSE), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were placed under FHFA conservatorship after they were bailed out in 2008. In recent weeks, there have been growing rumours that the FHFA is seeking to hasten the end of its conservatorship of the two agencies. Accelerating this process risks restricting household access to mortgage loans by prematurely ending the GSE Patch
On 20 October banking regulators finalised the transposition into American law of the Basel Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)* liquidity requirement. This requires banks to maintain a stable funding profile with regard to the theoretical liquidity of their exposure over a one-year period (in order to protect their capacity to maintain exposure in the event of a liquidity crisis). The final rule differs from the Basel standard, by allocating a nil stable funding requirement to high-quality liquid assets (such as Treasuries) and short-term loans guaranteed by such assets (reverse repos)**
On 16 September, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the euro zone announced the temporary exclusion of reserves with the Eurosystem from the calculation of leverage ratios at major banks. Similar relaxations had been introduced a few months earlier in the USA, Switzerland and the UK. The exceptional measures taken by public authorities to bolster liquidity have resulted in a significant expansion of banks’ balance sheets. Fearing that leverage requirements could hamper the transmission of monetary policy and affect banks’ abilities to lend to the economy, first regulators and then supervisors have temporarily relaxed such requirements
The bank lending pulse picked up slightly in the Eurozone in May 2020 (+1.9%, after +1.5% in April and +1.7% in March) even as Eurozone GDP is expected to have entered a record-breaking decline in Q2 (-13.5% q/q vs. -3.6% q/q in Q1 2020), as national lockdown measures have a lasting impact on economic activity. Bank lending to the private sector has accelerated rapidly since March (+5.3% in May, after +4.9% in April and +5% in March) after holding at a dynamic but relatively stable annual pace since summer 2018 (+3.5% on average). Lending to non-financial companies continued to grow at a rapid pace in May (+7.4% after +5.5% in March), offsetting the slowdown in household lending (+3%, after +3.4%)
The exceptional measures taken by the US authorities to bolster the liquidity of companies and markets in response to the Covid-19 crisis have resulted in a significant expansion of bank balance sheets. Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, regulators have tightened balance sheet constraints significantly. Fearing that leverage requirements could damage banks’ ability to finance the economy and support the smooth functioning of financial markets, these have temporarily been relaxed. However, the Federal Reserve is unlikely to undergo a slimming regime that will scale back bank balance sheets for a number of years (and almost certainly not before the end of the period of relaxation of requirements)
In response to the crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, in April the US Congress set up the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a small business lending programme guaranteed by the Federal government with an overall budget of nearly USD 650 billion. Under certain conditions, the loans can be converted into subsidies within the limit of payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent and utilities paid during the 24 weeks after the loan was granted. The loans will be partially or completely forgiven on condition that employment and wages are maintained by the end of the year. At 22 June, 4.6 million SME had borrowed more than USD 515 billion under the programme, virtually all of which was borrowed as early as mid-May
Pressure on dollar liquidity created an urgent need for action from the US Federal Reserve (the Fed). Assuming its role as the global lender of last resort - the consequence of its position as the issuer of the international trade and reserve currency - the Fed reactivated the permanent or temporary swap agreements that it established with 14 other central banks in 2008. In order to extend the reach of its dollar supply, the Fed has also created a repo facility for the central banks of countries that do not have dollar swap agreements. The high fees charged, however, will limit take-up, depriving the markets of what could be a significant calming influence.
The measures taken by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) since 15 March have already had a major impact on the balance sheets of commercial banks resident in the United States*. Their reserves held at the Central Bank have considerably increased following their role as intermediaries for the Fed’s securities purchases, emergency loans and liquidity swaps. As in 2008-2014, the Fed’s quantitative easing policy has also created a disconnect between growth in loans and growth in deposits on banks’ balance sheets. Since most of the Fed’s securities purchases have been from non-bank agents, customer deposits have grown more quickly than loans
In the end, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) did not wait for the next corporation tax payment deadline in April before intervening in the money market. In an attempt to stave off the risk of pressures on the market as a result of the coronavirus outbreak, it increased the scale of its repo transactions on Monday 9 March. At the end of last week, demand for cash from primary dealers far outstripped what the Fed was offering. Although the Fed has injected nearly USD 480 billion in additional central bank money since mid-September, the liquidity position (immediately available cash) at major US banks has not improved. On the one hand, bank reserves with the Fed have increased by only USD 280 billion, due to the growth in the Treasury’s general account
In the last three months, the US Federal Reserve has injected more than USD 360 bn of central bank money through repurchase agreement operations (repo) and outright purchases of T-bills. It will ramp up its intervention further between now and 31 December, to remove the risk of losing control of short-term rates again because of the specific needs of market participants as they approach their financial year-end. By the year-end, if the volume of demand for repo transactions reaches the total amount offered by the Fed, USD 650 bn of central bank money will have been injected. However, even that huge amount of support could prove insufficient
The 2014 reform of US money market funds led to a massive reallocation of cash from funds invested in private debt (prime funds) to funds invested in public debt (government funds)*. Foreign banks, traditional borrowers of prime funds, were deprived access to US dollars, while the US Treasury, federal agencies and American banks attracted fund inflows**. With the improvement in average returns over the past two years, the savings collected by government funds and prime funds have both increased sharply, up USD 450 bn and USD 430 bn, respectively
On 10 October 2019, US banking regulators increased the application thresholds for the capital and liquidity requirements imposed on large banks. Whilst the new rules do not change the prudential requirements for the eight biggest banking groups, they do reduce the burden for large regional banks. The number of banks subject to the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement will be reduced and the definition of core equity relaxed to some degree. In general terms, the rules as finalised over the past two months will significantly narrow the scope of application of Basel 3 in the USA. Given concern over lending trends in certain segments and the continued economic slowdown in the US, this relaxation of regulations catches attention.
Concerned about reducing pressure in the money markets, the Federal Reserve (Fed) will proceed with outright securities purchases in addition to its repurchase agreement operations (repo). At the end of the year, between USD 365 bn and 400 bn* in central bank money could thus be injected into the current accounts of banks. Given the current amount of the outstanding liquidity lent, the upward trend in currency in circulation and the foreseeable rebuilding of the Treasury account with the Fed, the banks’ reserves with the central bank are unlikely to increase by more than USD 130 bn by the end of the year (to a total of nearly USD 1600 bn, the April 2019 level)
