The German government has presented its draft budget for 2025, which is expected to be adopted in September. It is a breakaway budget marked by a clear return to public investment and support for business investment, at the cost of a significant increase in debt. This budget is one of the pillars of Germany's new policy, which should have a rapid positive impact on growth.
Many European countries have decided to significantly increase their military spending, led by Germany. Will this effort be conducive to growth? This will depend on whether or not Europe is able to increase its production of military equipment. It will also depend on the possible crowding-out effects (inflation, interest rates) associated with an increase in public debt. The ability of European industry to meet demand (an increase in EU military spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP) will be decisive. A reallocation of currently underutilised production capacity (mainly in the automotive and intermediate goods sectors) could help to increase production.
The Spending Review and the GBP 725 billion ten-year infrastructure plan, unveiled on 11 and 19 June, respectively, demonstrate the British government's desire to move away from forced fiscal consolidation. Getting public finances back on track remains a major challenge in the UK, which is constrained by pressure from the bond market, and provides a point of comparison for France. This is against a backdrop of major structural upheaval and growing investment needs. At this stage, we believe that the UK's fiscal consolidation strategy is credible, but the government is walking a tightrope.
The first half of 2025 was marked by two major turning points: the outbreak of a global trade war by the United States and, on the European side, announcements regarding rearmament efforts and the German investment plan, supporting the Old Continent's economic revival. The second half of the year will be marked by the aftermath of these announcements and is likely to be as hectic as the first, given the continuing uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the tariffs. The uncertainty surrounding the extent of their inflationary impact in the US and the duration of the Fed's monetary policy status quo is also significant. The risk of a derailment caused by fiscal policy remains
The fall in global oil prices is one of the most dramatic effects of the uncertainty generated by the tightening of US trade policy. The price of Brent crude is now expected to average USD 65 in 2025-2026, compared with USD 80 in 2024, and the risks of a further fall are high. For the Gulf States, where hydrocarbons account for 60% of budget revenues and 70% of exports, the consequences will be manifold.
France's fiscal deficit worsened in 2023 and 2024. Spending growth was maintained, despite the slowdown in public revenues growth. The 2025 budget should enable consolidation to begin thanks to a rebound in revenues. However, spending as a share of GDP is expected to remain relatively stable. The challenge of continuing fiscal consolidation in 2026 therefore remains intact. This exercise will be constrained by the expected increase in interest payments and military spending.
Central European economies have defied pessimist predictions in recent years on their ability to cope with shocks. The region posted a less pronounced GDP contraction in 2020 compared to advanced EU countries. In 2022, at the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the region was viewed as the most exposed within Europe due its high energy dependence on Russia. However, the widely expected recession did not occur as these economies implemented generous fiscal stimulus. Central European countries are now facing the tariff shock imposed by the US administration. Will this time be different?
Every Spring and Fall, economic and financial policymakers from the whole world gather in Washington DC for the IMF/WB Meetings. Thousands of private financial sector professionals tag along. All over town, in both formal and informal settings, participants share and compare with their peers their own assessments of the world’s economic prospects. In my 25 years of taking part in these Meetings, this was one of the most interesting ones, with a pervasive sense among participants of living through a pivotal moment of economic history. In what follows, I offer a distillation of what this global pulse-check revealed.
For several years now, Italy has had to generate primary budget surpluses in order to stabilize its public debt. The current level of fiscal deficits and the foreseeable increase in interest payments are likely to put the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in a similar situation in the coming years. These countries will ultimately have to balance their primary budgets if they want to stabilize their public debt.
• The euro area government deficit decreased in 2024 to -3.1% of GDP.• Italy and Greece posted primary surpluses even though their interest costs remain high• The fiscal adjustment that still needs to be provided by the countries whose deficits increased in 2024 (France, Austria, Belgium, Finland) will nevertheless act as a brake on growth in the zone.
The announcements on April 2, featuring a massive and widespread (albeit differentiated by country) increase in US tariffs, constitute a historic shock. The final extent of the damage and the aftershocks remain to be seen, but there is no doubt that the economic consequences will be negative, starting with the United States. They are already evident in the turbulence on US financial markets. Even if there is a de-escalation in the trade war, which is our base case scenario, uncertainty remains extremely high, and activity will be penalized for a long time.
By accelerating the fall in oil prices, the timing between OPEC+'s decision to accelerate quota easing, and the Trump administration’s announcement of the start of a tariff war could limit inflationary pressures for US consumers and put pressure on the cartel's undisciplined members. However, the convergence of interests between the heavyweights of the oil market is likely to be short-lived. This policy is likely to make the economic equation increasingly difficult for US producers. At the same time, by putting pressure on public finances, it poses a risk to the cohesion of the cartel.
Faced with US disengagement, the European Union has decided to close ranks and reinvest massively in its defence. On 6 March, the European Council therefore approved a plan that would theoretically raise EUR800 billion. This plan is split into two parts. The first will allow each Member State to deviate from its spending trajectory by 1.5% of GDP on average over a four-year period, without being subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In theory, this mechanism would provide an additional EUR650 billion of budgetary leeway. For the time being, several national governments have announced that they will not make use of the escape clause (France) or are not favourable to it (Italy, Spain).
As a result of the post-Covid debts surge and rising interest rates, the financial burden on governments is increasing. In the OECD, it has reached 3.3% of GDP, its highest level since 2010. For the European Union, the end of the period of cheap money coincides with a substantial increase in its borrowing requirements, partly linked to the need of rearmament. Public finances, already confronted with climate change and ageing populations, are under pressure and will not be able to meet all the challenges alone.
President Donald Trump has promised to bring manufacturing jobs back to the USA and make America again “the manufacturing superpower of the world that it once was”. This, of course, is the foremost objective of his radical tariff policy (alongside raising revenue and pressuring trading partners to deliver non-trade-related concessions). In his analysis, the US persistent trade deficit is evidence that the rest of the world is “ripping off” the US, through unfair trade barriers and overly weak exchange rates. As a result, the argument goes, the US industrial base is being hollowed out, undermining the living standards of Americans.
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
They say the Davos consensus is always wrong, but it usually takes longer than a couple of months to be apparent. Not so in 2025.
Government bond yields in advanced economies are highly correlated, much more than the correlation of real GDP growth. Governments should be cognizant that a lack of fiscal discipline can create negative externalities, by pushing up bond yields abroad. Given the prospect of huge financing needs in the public and private sector, every issuer of debt should prepare for the possibility of structurally higher interest rates and stress test his balance sheet in order to test its resilience.
We are almost a week away from a vote that could change the face of Germany. On 18 March, the Bundestag will decide on the adoption of two structural defence and infrastructure projects. A massive budget plan that could exceed EUR 1,000 billion over the next ten years and revive German growth, which has been absent for almost 3 years.
The result of the German election reveals a clear winner: the CDU/CSU. Only five parties were able to enter parliament, thereby reducing the fragmentation of the Bundestag. A grand coalition with the SPD is possible. Negotiations should begin soon to establish a common roadmap. When they come to an end, changes are to be expected: a German government that takes more initiative in European affairs, more public investment, increased defence spending and, as a result, a German budget deficit and public debt that could increase.
Peace talks have started. We do not know how soon or exactly where they will land. But things are moving fast. While much of the focus is, rightly, on the unexpectedly daunting geostrategic challenges, it’s not too soon to start mapping out the key economic implications for Europe.
While French growth reached 1.1% in 2023 and 2024, uncertainties, particularly of a political nature, are expected to drive growth slightly down in 2025 (0.7% according to our forecasts). The difference can be explained primarily by the weak growth carry-over after Q4 2024 and Q1 2025. However, we are probably over the worst and growth is expected to strengthen from Q2 onwards. In fact, implementation of the 2025 budget should restore confidence and allow an increase in public consumption compared to Q1 (when it was penalised by renewal of the 2024 budget). Basically, we think that the momentum of the transition to services - accompanied by strong business creations - has not been interrupted. Accordingly, the fundamentals of French growth are preserved.
The labour market in the UK continues to deteriorate. According to tax data (PAYE) published on 21 January by the ONS, the number of employees in the UK fell by 46,922 (-0.2% m/m) in December, the largest one-month decline since November 2021, which followed a drop of -0.1% in November. The year-on-year change drops drastically and falls below zero (-8,407) for the first time since April 2021.
“Not all died, but all were stricken”. While the Covid-19 pandemic spared no one, its consequences, particularly on the budgetary front, were not the same for everyone.
While emerging economies (EMEs), apart from China, have contributed little to global warming, the future CO2 emissions curve and the resulting additional temperature rise will largely hinge on their ability to conciliate growth and decarbonisation. However, due to limited financial resources, their investments in the "green" transition are low, at around 50 dollars a year per capita, compared to investments which are around seventeen times higher (850 dollars a year per capita) in developed countries. This disparity gave rise to the idea of securing transfers from developed to developing countries at the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), in 2009.
