China’s rise is undermining major sectors of European industry. However, as the German economy illustrates most clearly, Europe is shifting, driven by investment cycles in defence, electrification and artificial intelligence. It is redirecting its exports and managing to maintain strong positions, particularly in high value-added services, where exports to China are trending upwards. Yet this repositioning remains fragile and could be hampered by the economic costs of the conflict in the Middle East. To consolidate its positions, Europe must accelerate the unification of its internal market and do more to strengthen its industrial policy. This is the aim of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda.
The 15th Five-Year Plan, which outlines the roadmap for the Chinese economy from 2026 to 2030, does not signify a major shift in direction but rather continues on the path of the previous plan. It confirms, or rather reinforces, China’s development strategy based on asserting its export, industrial and technological power. Rather than focusing on rebalancing the growth model and boosting domestic consumption, Beijing is prioritising industry and innovation, seeking to increase its dominance in critical sectors and guarantee its ‘national security’
Economic growth accelerated in Q1, driven by the export-oriented manufacturing sector. The improvement in the business climate within the industry had signalled a strengthening of activity. Industrial production growth reached 6.1% year-on-year in Q1, vs. 5.0% in Q4 2025, supported by a sharp rise in exports – particularly of electronic goods. This momentum contributed to a slight recovery in investment in Q1. Growth in services, meanwhile, slowed from 5.6% y/y in Q4 2025 to 5.0% in Q1 2026. The rebound in retail sales observed in January–February did not last, due in particular to the waning impact of government subsidy schemes. The consumer confidence index has been recovering slowly for several months, but remains very low
China's economic growth model is based on imbalances, characterised by sluggish domestic demand, excess production capacities, strong exports and the pursuit of self-sufficiency, which have implications for its trading partners. While the IMF has recently reiterated the urgent need to boost private consumption, Beijing continues to give the priority to industrial policy and maintains moderately accommodative fiscal and monetary policies. It places cutting-edge sectors, innovation, AI and technological autonomy at the heart of its development strategy. This strategy aims to foster productivity gains and economic growth, while also consolidating China's dominance in global industry and its commitment to "national security".
In 2025, US–China trade tensions led to a sharp drop in US imports from China, while Chinese exports to other regions increased, indicating early signs of trade diversion. For Italy, estimates point to limited but notable export displacement, concentrated in specific sectors, alongside potential gains from lower-cost Chinese intermediate and capital goods. Italian firms report stronger competitive pressures and heightened uncertainty, particularly among exporters. Despite the challenges posed by tariffs and the redirection of Chinese exports in 2025, Italian exports have proved resilient, with growth recorded especially towards the United States.
PMIs improved slightly at the end of 2025. Chinese household sentiment is recovering slowly, but demand is still weak. Labour market is sluggish.
In today’s discussion, we delve into the public finances of emerging economies in 2025, based on an exclusive analysis of our most recent EcoPerspectives issue focused on these economies. With robust but slowing growth, rising public debt and limited fiscal flexibility, what challenges and opportunities lie ahead for these countries?
After a solid start to the year, Chinese economic growth has gradually slowed. Thanks to a rapid reorientation, exports have weathered the US tariff shock well. They are the main driver of economic activity, while domestic demand remains stubbornly fragile. The authorities have launched an “anti-involution” campaign, but adjusting demand policy in order to boost domestic investment and consumption, at a time when exports may begin to run out of steam, is also becoming urgent. Despite the deterioration in public finances in recent years, the central government and local governments still have some room for manoeuvre to act.
In the Chinese manufacturing sector, the official PMI has remained in contraction territory since April, but it improved to 49.8 in September. The PMI published by RatingDog (formerly Caixin) also improved (to 51.2 from 50.5 in August and 49.5 in July). This slight recovery is notably due to the “new export orders” sub-component, which reached 47.8 in the official index – a level that, while still in contraction territory, is at its highest since March. The export sector continues to withstand the rise in US tariffs.
In the first half of 2025 (H1 2025) and according to the Carbon Monitor website, China would have reduced its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by around 3% compared to the same period last year. Even if this is good news coming from the world's largest CO2 emitter (30% of the total), this is not surprising given the slowdown in the energy sector. In the same first half of 2025, the growth in electricity production slowed to 2.3% year-on-year, which is low by Chinese standards. Historically well correlated with emissions, weak electricity output largely explains the above-mentioned figure.
Since the beginning of the year, China’s economic growth has proved to be more robust than expected. Exports have withstood US tariff attacks and household consumption has recovered thanks to government stimulus programs. However, large clouds are casting a shadow over the picture and are likely to slow growth in the second half of the year. On the one hand, trade tensions with the United States remain high and the tech war continues, even though Beijing and Washington have agreed to extend their truce until November. On the other hand, internal structural problems remain (real estate crisis, labour market fragility, low confidence in the private sector, deflation). Despite this gloomy backdrop, economic policy easing remains cautious
Trade truce. The official PMI for the manufacturing sector has been in contraction territory since April, mainly due to the US-China trade war and worsening export prospects. However, the index rose slightly from 49 to 49.5 in May and 49.7 in June, following the agreement reached between Washington and Beijing (after discussions in London in early May and in Geneva in early June). The Caixin manufacturing PMI even rose above 50 in June (vs. 48.3 in May). In the services sector, the official PMI has been close to 50.3 for the past three months.
The protectionist shock imposed by the United States will lead to further adjustments in production chains and global trade. Will emerging countries (excluding China) be able to benefit once again, even as competition from Chinese products intensifies on their domestic markets? Will they be able to gain market share in the United States, or even in China? Will they be able to reduce their dependence on either of the two superpowers?
The sharp increase in US tariffs on Chinese imports is a major blow to Chinese exports and economic growth. However, Beijing has prepared for this, and the impact will be partially offset by its response strategy. In the short term, this strategy consists of redirecting exports to other markets, continuing monetary and fiscal policy easing, and boosting private consumption. The redeployment of exports has begun, but it could quickly run into new protectionist barriers. Domestically, the challenge will be to restore household confidence while the labour market may suffer as a result of the slowdown in the manufacturing sector.
Fragility of the manufacturing sector. The official manufacturing PMI improved slightly in May (to 49.5 from 49 in April) but remained in contraction territory. The Caixin manufacturing PMI fell sharply from 50.4 in April to 48.3 in May, its lowest level since September 2022. Caixin covers a smaller sample of companies than the NBS but includes more private-sector SMEs. These are particularly vulnerable to US tariff policy and the deterioration in export prospects.
Widespread deterioration. The official PMI for the manufacturing sector fell to 49 in April (from 50.5 in March) and the Caixin PMI fell to 50.4 (from 51.2 in March). The decline is widespread across all sub-components and heralds a significant slowdown in activity after the rebound in March. These are the immediate consequences of the new 145% tariffs imposed by the US on Chinese imports.
The tariff offensive led by Donald Trump since his return to the White House has quickly shifted into a face-off with China. Following a cycle of announcements and retaliation, the extra-tariffs applied by the United States to China amount to 145%, compared to 125% in the opposite direction. The shock is of unprecedented magnitude, and the two superpowers are engaged in a negative-sum game.
How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
In a 1933 article on national self-sufficiency, British economist John Maynard Keynes advised “those who seek to disembarrass a country from its entanglements” to be “very slow and wary” and illustrated his point with the following image: “It should not be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to grow in a different direction”. Nearly a century later, what are the precepts of the author of the General Theory worth?
Manufacturing PMIs rebounded in February, returning to their average level of Q4 2024 (50.2 for the NBS index and 50.8 for the Caixin index). In services, the PMIs remain below their Q4 level but are above the expansion threshold (50 for the NBS index and 51.4 for the Caixin index). The latest activity data confirm this reassuring but rather lacklustre performance: growth in industrial production slowed in January-February after accelerating in December, but held steady at almost 6% y/y. The slowdown in growth in production in services was more marked (+5.6% y/y in January-February, vs. +6.3% in Q4).
After a good start to the year, Chinese economic growth will slow down in 2025 due to still weak domestic demand and the effects of the upcoming protectionist shock on exports. China has tools at its disposal to respond to President Trump’s new tariff plans, even though its room for manoeuvre to offset the effects of rising tariff barriers with a depreciation of the yuan and a drop in export prices has narrowed compared to 2018. The authorities will continue to ease their monetary and fiscal policies in the short term to stimulate activity and boost private consumption, and try to support a rebalancing of China’s economic growth model.
Chinese economic growth accelerated in Q4 2024 (+1.6% q/q and +5.4% y/y), driven by strong export performance and a recovery in private consumption. These supporting factors should persist in early 2025, but economic growth will then resume its downward trend. Domestic demand is likely to remain fragile and the rise in US tariffs will be a significant negative shock to exports.
In China, economic policy has taken a firmly expansionary turn since late September. This has given a boost to activity, which is expected to strengthen further in the very short term. However, over 2025 as a whole, economic growth will continue to slow. The constraints weighing on domestic demand persist, as the adjustments in the property sector are not yet complete, private sector confidence remains fragile and households are waiting for conditions in the labour market to improve. In addition, the risks to growth have increased with the election of Donald Trump. China will be able to respond to new US customs barriers in various ways, ranging from retaliatory measures to depreciating its currency and continuing to re-route its trade flows
Activity indicators for October showed encouraging signs of accelerating growth. The support policy measures implemented by the authorities are finally beginning to bear fruit. However, the improvement is not widespread, as deflationary pressures persisted and credit growth continued to weaken.
China is the world’s second economy. It is also the world’s largest exporter of goods, a global industrial leader and a global financial player. The process of capital account liberalisation and renmimbi (RMB) internationalisation continues gradually and the opening of local asset markets to non-resident investors made rapid progress in the recent past. Meanwhile, controls over resident capital outflows remain significant.
China’s exchange rate regime is a managed float. The Chinese currency has gradually become more flexible and market-determined in recent years, but government discretion keeps significant influence on the direction of the fx rate. The RMB was included as the fifth currency in the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in October 2016.
Economic growth fell to 7.1% per year in 2012-2019 from 10.7% in 2002-2011. In 2020, the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated the Chinese economy’s strong capacity to absorb a major shock and rebound; real GDP returned to its pre-crisis level at the end of Q2 2020 and economic growth reached 2.3% in 2020 as a whole.
In the medium term, China’s structural slowdown is projected to continue. China continues a difficult economic transition: its investment/export-led growth model has reached its limits and far-reaching reforms are still needed to build a more balanced growth model that is more reliant on consumption and services, and less dependent on debt.
