Our barometer shows an improvement in China’s economic momentum during the period between March and May 2020, compared to the preceding three months. This came as no surprise as economic activity collapsed in February, the first month of the lockdown, before beginning a very gradual recovery in March...
Economic activity contracted sharply in February, the first month of the lockdown, before rebounding very gradually in March and April. The recovery is bound to be very slow after this brutal first-quarter shock [...]
China’s population and its economy were the first to be struck by the coronavirus epidemic. Activity contracted abruptly during the month of February before rebounding thereafter at a very gradual pace. Although the situation on the supply side is expected to return to normal in Q2, the demand shock will persist. Domestic investment and consumption will suffer from the effects of lost household and corporate revenues while world demand is falling. The authorities still have substantial resources to intervene to help restart the economy. Central government finances are not threatened. However, after the shock to GDP growth, the expected upsurge in domestic debt ratios will once again aggravate vulnerabilities in the financial sector.
The most recent PMIs announced the shock earlier this month: industrial production fell strongly in January-February 2020, declining by 13.5% year-on-year. China also registered a very severe contraction in total exports (-18% y/y), fixed-asset investment (-24.5%) and volumes of retail sales (-23.7%). Such a collapse in economic activity is an unprecedented situation in China, which is expected to record a contraction in real GDP in Q1 2020. Activity has been recovering gradually in recent days, and a rebound in real GDP growth is expected in Q2 2020, notably supported by the authorities’ stimulus policy measures
A large number of economic sectors have been struggling with the impact of the Covid-19 epidemic on Chinese consumer demand, transport, tourist flows and industrial production chains. Over the past month, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has loosened monetary and credit conditions in order to support local corporates, help them cover their cash requirements et encourage a rapid recovery in activity. PBOC has injected a large amount of liquidity into the financial system, reduced interest rates – monetary rates, medium-term lending facility rate and benchmark lending rate – and announced special loans to firms directly affected by the virus outbreak. As a result, the weighted average lending rate, which has declined since Q2 2018 (from 5.94% to 5
In 2019, economic growth slowed to 6.1%. Total exports contracted and domestic demand continued to weaken. The year 2020 is getting off to a better start as activity shows a few signs of recovering and a preliminary trade agreement was just signed with the United States. Yet economic growth prospects are still looking downbeat in 2020. The rebalancing of China’s growth sources is proving to be a long and hard process, and economic policy is increasingly complex to manage. Faced with this situation, Beijing might decide to give new impetus to the structural reform process, the only solution that will maintain the newfound optimism and boost economic prospects in the medium term.
Economic growth slowed to 6.0% y/y in Q3 2019 from 6.4% in Q4 2018. This is well under the annual average of 8% recorded over the past decade: the structural slowdown continues, aggravated since last year by the consequences of US protectionist measures on exports. Growth in private consumption has also decelerated, delaying the process of rebalancing of Chinese growth sources. Fiscal and monetary policy easing measures have been multiplied, and their impact on domestic demand should be visible in the last quarter of 2019.
Since Q2 2018, Beijing has let the yuan depreciate against the dollar each time the US has raised its tariffs on imported goods from China. Yet, exchange rate policy as an instrument to support economic activity is expected to be used moderately in the short term. There is also little room to stimulate credit given the excessively high debt levels of the economy and the authorities’ priority on pursuing efforts to clean up the financial system, the public sector and the housing market. Torn between stimulating economic growth and deleveraging, the authorities’ dilemma could get worse if recent fiscal stimulus measures do not have the intended impact on domestic demand, or if the external environment were to deteriorate further.
Since Q2 2018, Beijing has let the yuan depreciate against the dollar each time the US has raised its tariffs on imported goods from China. Yet, exchange rate policy as an instrument to support economic activity should be used moderately in the short term. There is also little room to stimulate credit given the excessively high debt levels of the economy and the authorities’ priority on pursuing efforts to clean up the financial system, the public sector and the housing market. Torn between stimulating economic growth and deleveraging, the authorities’ dilemma could get worse if recent fiscal stimulus measures do not have the intended impact on domestic demand, or if the external environment were to deteriorate further.
Between the end of March 2018 and the end of August 2019, the yuan lost nearly 13% against the dollar. With each new increase in US tariffs (announced or effective), the Chinese authorities have responded by letting the yuan depreciate to offset partially the impact on export corporates. In September, despite the introduction of new tariffs, the yuan levelled off against the dollar, because Beijing and Washington had agreed to restart trade talks. In the short term, exchange rate policy is likely to be used moderately to stimulate economic growth, especially due to the risk of a vicious circle as the anticipation of currency depreciation fuels new capital outflows triggered by the yuan’s decline. Yet this risk is limited, however, by ongoing controls on resident capital outflows
Private consumption has played a greater role in the Chinese economy in recent years, but this growth engine remains fragile. At a time when the export sector is hurt by US protectionist measures and weak global demand, China is seeking other solid sources of growth. Yet private consumption growth is slowing and is likely to be disappointing in the short and medium terms. A catching-up dynamic should continue, supported by urbanization, an ageing population and action of the government, which strives to reduce income inequality, improve housing affordability and further strengthen the social protection system. owever, these structural changes will take time
With the export sector hard hit by US tariff measures and private consumption growth weakening, investment growth has slowed. Although domestic demand could pick up in the short term, bolstered by monetary easing and fiscal stimulus measures, export prospects depend on the outcome of trade talks between Beijing and Washington, which remains highly uncertain. The authorities are bound to use foreign exchange policy sparingly to avoid creating a source of financial instability. Moreover, the current account surplus has improved again in recent months.
Industrial enterprises were squeezed by tighter financing conditions in 2017 and early 2018, and then hit by a slowdown in production and revenue growth last year. These troubles have contributed to the deterioration of their payment capacity, resulting in a surge in defaults in the local bond market. The increase in defaults is an indicator of the financial fragility of corporates, and also seems to be going hand-in-hand with greater differentiation of credit risks by lenders and a certain clean-up of the financial sector. These trends are expected to continue in the short term as the authorities conduct a targeted easing of monetary policy. However, the persistence of the debt excess in the corporate sector will maintain high credit risks in the medium term.
The plethora of data released this week didn’t remove concern about the Chinese growth slowdown. Lunar holiday bias and the recent fiscal stimulus measures imply it is too early to draw firm conclusions. The matter is important for the global economy given China’s weight. It is also important for key exporters to China such as Germany. Against this background, reaching a trade agreement with the US becomes key.
In China, real GDP growth slowed to 6.4% in Q4 2018 year-on-year from 6.5% in Q3. The slowdown in the industrial sector worsened in Q4 while growth in the services sector remains more dynamic. Regarding demand components, exports have weakened markedly in the two last months of 2018, mostly due to the impact of US tariff hikes on imports of Chinese goods. Growth in household consumption has continued to decelerate (especially in the car market).
Economic growth slowed to 6.6% in 2018 from 6.8% in 2017 and should continue to decelerate in the short term. The extent of the slowdown will depend on the still highly uncertain evolution of trade tensions between China and the United States as well as on Beijing’s counter-cyclical policy measures. However, the central bank’s manoeuvring room is severely constrained by the economy’s excessive debt burden and the threat of capital outflows. Moreover, whereas Beijing has pursued efforts to improve financial regulation and the health of state-owned companies over the past two years, its new priorities increase the risk of interruption in this clean-up process. Faced with this situation, the central government will have to make greater use of fiscal stimulus measures.
Economic growth slowed to 6.6% in 2018 from 6.9% in 2017 and should continue to decelerate in the short term. The extent of the slowdown will depend on the still highly uncertain evolution of trade tensions between China and the United States as well as on Beijing’s counter-cyclical policy measures. However, the central bank’s manoeuvring room is severely constrained by the economy’s excessive debt burden and the threat of capital outflows. Moreover, whereas Beijing has pursued efforts to improve financial regulation and the health of state-owned companies over the past two years, its new priorities increase the risk of interruption in this clean-up process. Faced with this situation, the central government will have to make greater use of fiscal stimulus measures.
China is the world’s second economy. It is also the world’s largest exporter of goods, a global industrial leader and a global financial player. The process of capital account liberalisation and renmimbi (RMB) internationalisation continues gradually and the opening of local asset markets to non-resident investors made rapid progress in the recent past. Meanwhile, controls over resident capital outflows remain significant.
China’s exchange rate regime is a managed float. The Chinese currency has gradually become more flexible and market-determined in recent years, but government discretion keeps significant influence on the direction of the fx rate. The RMB was included as the fifth currency in the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in October 2016.
Economic growth fell to 7.1% per year in 2012-2019 from 10.7% in 2002-2011. In 2020, the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated the Chinese economy’s strong capacity to absorb a major shock and rebound; real GDP returned to its pre-crisis level at the end of Q2 2020 and economic growth reached 2.3% in 2020 as a whole.
In the medium term, China’s structural slowdown is projected to continue. China continues a difficult economic transition: its investment/export-led growth model has reached its limits and far-reaching reforms are still needed to build a more balanced growth model that is more reliant on consumption and services, and less dependent on debt.