The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and the acceleration of the US-China decoupling will lead to a slowdown in global economic growth, a further reconfiguration of international trade, and the continued reorganization of value chains. These changes will have multiple consequences for emerging countries. All will suffer negative effects linked to the slowdown in their exports and increased competition from Chinese products. Some may also seize new opportunities to attract FDI and develop their export base.
The first half of 2025 was marked by two major turning points: the outbreak of a global trade war by the United States and, on the European side, announcements regarding rearmament efforts and the German investment plan, supporting the Old Continent's economic revival. The second half of the year will be marked by the aftermath of these announcements and is likely to be as hectic as the first, given the continuing uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the tariffs. The uncertainty surrounding the extent of their inflationary impact in the US and the duration of the Fed's monetary policy status quo is also significant. The risk of a derailment caused by fiscal policy remains
The fall in global oil prices is one of the most dramatic effects of the uncertainty generated by the tightening of US trade policy. The price of Brent crude is now expected to average USD 65 in 2025-2026, compared with USD 80 in 2024, and the risks of a further fall are high. For the Gulf States, where hydrocarbons account for 60% of budget revenues and 70% of exports, the consequences will be manifold.
The gradual recovery in demand, which has been noticeable for almost six months, seems to be continuing in the Eurozone. It remains to be confirmed given the uncertainties surrounding US trade policy. Nevertheless, the trend towards improvement has not been called into question by the decisions taken so far. In the medium term, the implementation of the European rearmament plan and the German investment plans should strengthen this dynamic.
The EU-UK summit on 19 May marks a new phase in economic rapprochement, more than five years after the Brexit, which has undeniably weakened the UK economy. The structural challenges facing the UK – high inflation, sluggish business investment, low productivity – partly result from this event.
The investment required to meet the challenges of competitiveness and energy and technology transition in the European Union is huge, and the need for it is imminent (2025-2030). To this must now be added expenditure to strengthen the European Union's military capabilities. To finance this, the EU must of course speed up its roadmap towards a Savings and Investment Union. But given the urgency, it must also take account of its financial ecosystem and rely on its banks. The postponement of the FRTB (Fundamental Review of Trading Book) until 2027 and the European Commission's legislative proposal on securitisation, expected in June, are steps in this direction.
France's fiscal deficit worsened in 2023 and 2024. Spending growth was maintained, despite the slowdown in public revenues growth. The 2025 budget should enable consolidation to begin thanks to a rebound in revenues. However, spending as a share of GDP is expected to remain relatively stable. The challenge of continuing fiscal consolidation in 2026 therefore remains intact. This exercise will be constrained by the expected increase in interest payments and military spending.
Central European economies have defied pessimist predictions in recent years on their ability to cope with shocks. The region posted a less pronounced GDP contraction in 2020 compared to advanced EU countries. In 2022, at the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the region was viewed as the most exposed within Europe due its high energy dependence on Russia. However, the widely expected recession did not occur as these economies implemented generous fiscal stimulus. Central European countries are now facing the tariff shock imposed by the US administration. Will this time be different?
Since January 2025, the United States has announced major reversals in its foreign and trade policies. For developing countries that depend on international aid, the suspension of USAID and the increase in tariffs on US imports create a double shock that will durably weaken their economic prospects.
Since WWII ended, 80 years ago this week, the US dollar has been the unparalleled dominant currency at the center of the international monetary and financial system. Every now and then, questions have arisen about this dominance and for brief periods became front page material in the financial press. Despite the excitement invariably elicited, the answer was always, sit tight, nothing is going to change. This time feels different. In particular, financial markets’ reaction to the “Liberation Day” tariff announcements, whereby the dollar and US Treasuries sold off instead of being bought as the safe haven of last resort like in all previous crises. But it would be premature to call the end of dollar dominance.
The vast majority of Latin American countries have been subject to 10% tariffs, the minimum rate, since April 2, imposed by the Trump administration. This leniency is due to the composition of their exports (raw materials and energy, whereas the Trump administration's “reciprocal” tariffs mainly targeted exporters of manufactured goods) and the fact that most of them have a trade deficit with the US.
Every Spring and Fall, economic and financial policymakers from the whole world gather in Washington DC for the IMF/WB Meetings. Thousands of private financial sector professionals tag along. All over town, in both formal and informal settings, participants share and compare with their peers their own assessments of the world’s economic prospects. In my 25 years of taking part in these Meetings, this was one of the most interesting ones, with a pervasive sense among participants of living through a pivotal moment of economic history. In what follows, I offer a distillation of what this global pulse-check revealed.
For several years now, Italy has had to generate primary budget surpluses in order to stabilize its public debt. The current level of fiscal deficits and the foreseeable increase in interest payments are likely to put the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in a similar situation in the coming years. These countries will ultimately have to balance their primary budgets if they want to stabilize their public debt.
• The euro area government deficit decreased in 2024 to -3.1% of GDP.• Italy and Greece posted primary surpluses even though their interest costs remain high• The fiscal adjustment that still needs to be provided by the countries whose deficits increased in 2024 (France, Austria, Belgium, Finland) will nevertheless act as a brake on growth in the zone.
The announcements on April 2, featuring a massive and widespread (albeit differentiated by country) increase in US tariffs, constitute a historic shock. The final extent of the damage and the aftershocks remain to be seen, but there is no doubt that the economic consequences will be negative, starting with the United States. They are already evident in the turbulence on US financial markets. Even if there is a de-escalation in the trade war, which is our base case scenario, uncertainty remains extremely high, and activity will be penalized for a long time.
On Wednesday 5 March, the 10-year Bund yield increased 30bp, the biggest rise since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It continued to move higher the following days, reaching a peak on 11 March. The trigger was the announcement by Friedrich Merz (CDU) and the heads of the CSU and SPD during an evening press conference on Tuesday 4 March 2025 that they agreed to reform the debt brake, that defence spending above 1 percent of GDP would be exempt from this debt brake and that a EUR 500bn fund for infrastructure investments would be created. The developments in the German bond market had sizeable spillover effects across markets in the Eurozone. This didn’t come as a surprise.
By accelerating the fall in oil prices, the timing between OPEC+'s decision to accelerate quota easing, and the Trump administration’s announcement of the start of a tariff war could limit inflationary pressures for US consumers and put pressure on the cartel's undisciplined members. However, the convergence of interests between the heavyweights of the oil market is likely to be short-lived. This policy is likely to make the economic equation increasingly difficult for US producers. At the same time, by putting pressure on public finances, it poses a risk to the cohesion of the cartel.
Faced with US disengagement, the European Union has decided to close ranks and reinvest massively in its defence. On 6 March, the European Council therefore approved a plan that would theoretically raise EUR800 billion. This plan is split into two parts. The first will allow each Member State to deviate from its spending trajectory by 1.5% of GDP on average over a four-year period, without being subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In theory, this mechanism would provide an additional EUR650 billion of budgetary leeway. For the time being, several national governments have announced that they will not make use of the escape clause (France) or are not favourable to it (Italy, Spain).
Last week, the Trump administration announced tariffs against the entire world which, added to those of previous weeks, will raise the average external tariff of the United States to 22%, compared with 2.5% at the end of 2024. Financial markets have reacted extremely badly, and suggest even more serious fears for US growth than for global growth. Many unknowns remain, but this scenario is the most plausible. For the United States' trading partners, it would be better to resist the temptation to escalate and instead to double down on strengthening the engines of domestic growth. Europe is particularly well placed to do this.
The vulnerability of ASEAN countries to US trade protectionism has increased significantly since 2017. The US has become a key destination for these countries, which export low-intensity tech products (such as textiles and footwear) as well as medium-intensity tech products (mobile phones) and high-intensity tech products (integrated circuits and semiconductors). Vietnam, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia have the largest trade surpluses with the US and are therefore the most exposed to a change in US tariff policy.On 2 April, the US government announced an increase in tariffs on ASEAN countries that goes well beyond simple reciprocity
How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
As a result of the post-Covid debts surge and rising interest rates, the financial burden on governments is increasing. In the OECD, it has reached 3.3% of GDP, its highest level since 2010. For the European Union, the end of the period of cheap money coincides with a substantial increase in its borrowing requirements, partly linked to the need of rearmament. Public finances, already confronted with climate change and ageing populations, are under pressure and will not be able to meet all the challenges alone.
In recent weeks, with the erratic announcements and implementation of the first Trumponomics 2.0 measures, a less favorable wind has been blowing across the US economy, whether it be Main Street or Wall Street. Between rising fears about inflation and growth, how long can the Fed extend the status quo on its policy rates?
President Donald Trump has promised to bring manufacturing jobs back to the USA and make America again “the manufacturing superpower of the world that it once was”. This, of course, is the foremost objective of his radical tariff policy (alongside raising revenue and pressuring trading partners to deliver non-trade-related concessions). In his analysis, the US persistent trade deficit is evidence that the rest of the world is “ripping off” the US, through unfair trade barriers and overly weak exchange rates. As a result, the argument goes, the US industrial base is being hollowed out, undermining the living standards of Americans.
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
