Contrary to expectations (annualised quarterly growth of 1%) US GDP contracted by an annualised quarterly rate of 1.4% in Q1 2022. This surprise fall hides a more nuanced and less negative reality. The economic engines of household consumption and business investment are robust and contributed 1.8 points and 1.3 points of growth respectively. However, reduced inventories at companies (contribution from changes in inventory of -0.8 of a point) and a reduction in public spending (contribution of -0.5 of a point), due to the ending of several support programmes, had a negative effect on growth. But the biggest negative contribution came from international trade (-3.2 points), which was the main reason for the drop in quarterly GDP
The US yield curve has flattened, giving rise to comments that, given the historical experience, risk of a recession is increasing. Yet, when drawing conclusions, caution is warranted. Market-based inflation expectations, which are very high, should decline after a number of rate hikes. This could pull down long-term nominal bond yields, leading to a further flattening or even an inversion of the curve. However, a decline in inflation is growth-supportive. Another reason for caution is that due to past central bank asset purchases, the slope of the yield curve is less steep. Past QE may thus reduce its quality as a leading indicator of economic growth. For these reasons, an alternative indicator has been developed
With inflation soaring, the US Federal Reserve announced that it would accelerate the process of normalising its monetary policy. Held near the lower zero bound until March, the key policy rate should rise to roughly 2% or even higher by the end of the year. The Fed will also reduce the size of its balance sheet. Operating at full employment, the US economy seems to have recovered sufficiently from the health crisis to pass muster. Yet it is still sensitive to credit conditions and is not immunised against the impact of the war in Ukraine.
Very few survey results are available yet for March 2022, but they are all mediocre, which shows that the harmful impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine is not limited solely to Europe. Although it hasn’t collapsed, the Conference Board’s household confidence index has fallen from peak levels. In the Philadelphia and New York regions, industrial leaders are seeing darker horizons, which is probably due as well to the resurgence of the Covid-19 pandemic in China, which promises to further aggravate supply chain tensions that are already very high.
Although the war in Ukraine is casting shadows on the global economy, the Federal Reserve announced that it would rapidly normalise US monetary policy. The Fed’s main arguments for taking action include surging inflation, which is also spreading widely, as well as tight labour market conditions and tensions over wages. As the self-sustaining nature of price increases is still open for debate, the projected tightening of monetary policy looks surprisingly strong. In an economic environment accustomed to cheap borrowing costs, the Fed’s move is not without risks regarding the future path of activity.
The FOMC has started a new tightening cycle and its members project 6 additional increases in the federal funds rate this year and 4 more in 2023. This hawkish stance is unsurprising. After all, the policy rate is very low, inflation is exceptionally high and the economy is strong. Given the Fed’s dual mandate, the pace and extent of rate hikes will depend on the evolution of inflation as well as the unemployment rate. Previous tightening cycles suggest that concerns about the risk of an increase in the unemployment rate have played an important role in the decision to stop hiking. The central bank will have to hope that inflation has dropped sufficiently by the time that this risk would re-emerge.
The latest monitoring report by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)1 shows that despite very accommodating monetary policies, the immediately available liquidity position of the big American banks did not improve between Q4 2019 and Q2 2021, unlike that of the big European banks2. According to the first published data, the average short-term liquidity ratio, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)3 was 116% for the American G-SIBs in Q4 2021, compared to 119% in Q4 2019, while that of the European G-SIBs was about 173% and 141%, respectively. In both cases, the average ratios were still significantly higher than the minimum prudential requirement of 100%
Unlike the European Union, which is relatively dependent on Russian energy, the United States does not have the highest exposure to the shock. As the world’s leading hydrocarbon producer, the US can even offset the shortfall of Russian production, at least partially. But in a more uncertain environment that is less propitious for spending, the US economy will not be sheltered. Looking beyond the stock market decline, a few business climate indicators, including the Philly Fed Index and the Empire Manufacturing Index, have already begun to signal a less euphoric environment.
In his press conference last week, Fed chairman Jerome Powell was very clear. Based on the FOMC’s two objectives – inflation and maximum employment – the data warrant to start hiking interest rates in March and, probably, to move swiftly thereafter. In doing so, it will be “led by the incoming data and the evolving outlook”. This data-dependency reflects a concern of tightening too much and makes monetary policy harder to predict. The faster the Fed tightens, the higher the likelihood of having it take a pause to see how the economy reacts.
The latest US economic data can be viewed in two ways. The optimistic approach would be to welcome strong Q4 2021 growth (6.7% annualised) and the fact that the economy is now almost no remaining Covid after-effects, since output has already moved back to its pre-pandemic trajectory. The second and more cautious approach would be to point out that investment has moved sideways and that growth would have been much weaker (1.6% annualised) without the exceptional contribution of inventories.
The minutes of the December meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have shown a distinct and sudden shift towards a more hawkish stance. The reduction of the pace of net asset purchases (tapering) has been stepped up, the first rate hike is expected to come earlier and the FOMC participants favour an early start and a faster pace of quantitative tightening (QT). Although they are more relaxed about QT than in 2017, it remains a tricky operation. The challenge will be to find the right balance between QT and the number of rate hikes in order to bring inflation under control without jeopardizing growth. History shows that achieving a soft landing is difficult.
Since November 2020, there has been a significant increase in repurchase1 agreements by the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) with foreign central banks as part of the Foreign Repo Pool (FRRP). Two statistical series can be used to identify the Fed’s main counterparts.The structure of official foreign reserves2 indicates the amount of deposits (in the broad sense of the term, including repurchase agreements) made by each economy with “foreign central banks, the Bank of International Settlements, and the International Monetary Fund”. Given the weight of the USD, EUR, JPY and GBP in global foreign reserves, the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Bank of England are probably the main beneficiaries
The Fed gets serious. Faced with an unprecedented increase in inflation (6.9% y/y in November, probably scarcely less in December) the Federal Reserve will tighten monetary policy more than previously expected.
With the inflationary surge in the US showing no signs of stopping, the Federal Reserve is no longer taking a accommodative stance and could accelerate the tapering of quantitative easing. Inflation has also spread to asset prices: real estate and stock prices have climbed to peak levels. Unless the emergence of the Omicron variant radically changes the situation, everything points to a key rate hike in 2022, possibly as early as next summer.
The rising trend in prices in the USA is far from over and has become a real focus of attention. In November 2021, inflation was 6.8% year-on-year (yy), its highest level since June 1982. Although soaring energy prices (up 33% yy) contributed to the increase in the cost of living, as in previous months, these were no longer the sole cause. Even stripping out energy and food, inflation was still 4.9% in November, another record. Having risen by 3.9% yy, rents, which represent the main item of expenditure for households (33% of the index), are beginning to have a significant effect. Far from being anecdotal, their increase has accelerated month after month in the wake of the surge in real estate prices
Last July, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) expanded its scope of intervention in the money markets. It now has a permanent repo facility (Standing Repo Facility or SRF) in addition to its reverse repo facility (Reverse Repo Program or RRP). These tools should allow the Fed to modulate its supply of central bank money, downwards as well as upwards, in periods of pressure on short-term market rates. In the current context of abundant central bank liquidity and limited supply of government securities, money market funds have made considerable use of the RRP. The ability of the SRF to reduce tension in the event of a drying up of central bank liquidity could, however, be countered by various factors such as the leverage constraints to which primary dealers and banks are subject.
The US banking system’s exposure to the Eurozone has significantly increased since 2016, the year of the referendum in favour of the UK’s exit from the European Union. Between 31 March 2016 and 30 June 2021, claims of the eight biggest US banks1 on Eurozone2 residents (excluding the public sector) have grown by more (USD 125.6 billion) than claims on the UK economy have fallen (USD 56.3 billion). The main beneficiaries of this switch include France (up USD 66.3 billion, or +47%), Luxembourg (up USD36.5 billion, +97%), Ireland (USD 28.8 billion, +46%) and Germany (USD 5.8 billion, +7%). Most of this expansion has been concentrated at Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan.US banks’ cross-border exposure to the Eurozone (i.e
The “transitory” surge in inflation is proving to be long lasting. In October, US inflation rose to 6.2% year-on-year, the highest level in 31 years. As in previous months, the main explanation is a ballooning energy bill (which accounts for 30% of this figure), but the acceleration in prices is spreading throughout the US economy. It can be seen in the cost of shelter, which is already up 3.5% year-on-year, and is surely bound to accelerate.
A recent academic paper argues that, considering the significant recent decline of consumer expectations, the US could be entering recession. However, Covid-19 complicates the interpretation of household confidence data. Fluctuations in infections play a role and the recovery from last year’s recession as well as other factors have caused a jump in inflation. Given the historically high quits rate, the weakening in household sentiment probably reflects mounting concern about the impact of inflation on spending power. Something similar has been observed in the latest consumer confidence data for France.
In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the US Congress set up the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) in April 2020 to provide loans backed by the Federal government to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). When subscriptions closed on 31 May 2021, about USD 800 bn in PPP loans had been issued. Banks originated 80% of these loans and non-banking lending companies and fintechs issued the remaining 20%. Several aspects of this programme differ from France’s state-backed loan programme (PGE), especially its fiscal cost. First, in the United States, the Federal government fully covers the credit risk associated with government-guaranteed loans1. Second, American lenders receive fees to compensate for the cost of originating PPP loans (between 1% and 5% depending on the principal amount)
One of the shocking paradoxes of America, cradle of the miracle of vaccines against Covid-19, is that the country is still seeing daily death numbers in the thousands. The still-too-deadly wave of the epidemic over the summer may have contributed to the slowing of the recovery in employment.
On the whole, the US economy has recovered very quickly, albeit unequally, from the loss of business caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Exceptional Federal transfers have fuelled a spectacular rebound in private consumption, so much so that it is nearly overheating. Faced with a global parts shortage and hiring troubles, companies are having a hard time meeting demand. Prices have come under pressure. For the US Federal Reserve, the time has come to begin withdrawing monetary support. The debt ceiling has just been hit, and major budget bills remain in suspense until an agreement to raise the limit can be reached with the Republicans.
In his traditional monetary-policy speech to the annual Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell expressed satisfaction with the latest US jobs market figures. He had good reason to do so: in the three months from June to August, the US economy created more than 2.2 million jobs (non-farm activities), including almost 800.000 in the resurgent tourism industry (hotels, restaurants, leisure etc.). Although the Covid-19 jobs deficit remains large (around 5.5 million) and although the unemployment rate is still too high by American standards (5.2%), the situation is gradually returning to normal.
On 28 July, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) announced that it would establish a Standing Repo Facility (SRF). Each eligible counterparty* will now be able to borrow, every business day and on an overnight basis, up to USD 120 billion of central-bank liquidity as part of the SRF**. Operations will bear interest at the marginal lending facility rate (25bp) and be capped at USD 500 billion.The SRF gives the Fed a new tool for detecting possible central-bank money shortages. In September 2019, the system was introduced on an emergency basis and temporarily, and helped to ease the repo markets crisis
Annual inflation has reached 5.3% in the US in June. Its drivers are still very concentrated but there is concern that they will spread. Anecdotal evidence is accumulating that price pressures faced by companies are increasing. Price pressures as reported in the ISM survey send the same signal. Historically, they have been highly correlated with producer price inflation and consumer price inflation but the transmission depends on factors such as pricing power, competitive position, labour market bottlenecks, etc. The next several months will be crucial for the Federal Reserve and for financial markets, considering the Fed’s conviction that the inflation increase should be temporary
The United States remain the world’s largest economy in nominal GDP terms. Although at the root of the global financial crisis (2008-09), the country has swiftly recovered over the past decade, partly helped by the boom in the shale oil and gas industry. However, it has also lost ground in some other key industrial areas, mainly against China. At the same time, China has become a world leader in the strategic field of information and telecommunication equipment, and therefore a top supplier to US companies. This increased dependency, along with persistent and widening trade deficits, has led to a radical shift in foreign trade policy and a sizeable rise in US tariffs on imports.
As a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis, the US economy fell by 3.4% in 2020. The recession -the deepest since 1946- was nevertheless followed by a swift and strong rebound in 2021, the United-States being among the first countries to be vaccinated as well as to recover from the economic losses caused by the pandemic. In the aftermath of the authorities’ action to limit the consequences of the crisis, public debt and deficits have surged.
