In the first half of 2022, large non-financial companies in the euro area were more inclined to take out new bank loans than to issue debt securities. According to the latest data available, bond issuance remained depressed in July and August. At the beginning of 2022, the average costs of negotiable debt and business bank loans were at comparable levels (for example, 1.1% for French companies in January 2022, according to calculations by the Banque de France1). The cost of bank loans is now, on a relative basis, markedly lower (1.65%) since the surge in inflation and tensions on the bond market have led to a much more perceptible average increase in the cost of negotiable debt issued by non-financial companies (3.69% in June 2022)
At the Jackson Hole symposium, Fed chair Powell and Banque de France governor Villeroy de Galhau have insisted that their responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It gives a new meaning to ‘whatever it takes’. Faced with uncertainty about the persistence of elevated inflation, the Federal Reserve and the ECB will increase their policy rates to bring inflation under control, whatever the short-run cost to the economy, because not doing enough now would entail an even bigger economic cost subsequently. Equity markets declined and bond yields moved higher. Tighter financial conditions will help the monetary tightening in achieving the desired slowdown in growth
Over the past few weeks, Central Europe has experienced a spike in Government bond yields. Five-year yields have surged respectively by 338 bp in Poland, 331 bp in Hungary, 350 bp in Romania and 216 bp in Czech Republic since January 2022 and are at present similar to 2008 levels. The trend is also the same for 10-year yields. The recent move can be explained to some extent by markets’ overreaction as regards to the relatively high exposure of Central European countries to Russia in terms of exports and energy supply. Moreover, their geographical proximity with Ukraine and Russia have contributed to markets’ perception of higher geopolitical risk. In the meantime, monetary policy tightening, a consequence of higher inflationary pressures (respectively +16
Flows of new non-performing loans of Italian non-financial corporations (NFCs)[1] stood at 2.4% of outstanding amounts of performing loans in the fourth quarter of 2021, from 1.4% in the third. Starting from an historically low level, the significant rise in this ratio[2] is due to the flows of new non-performing loans, which increased by 67% in the fourth quarter of 2021, whilst outstanding amounts of performing loans remained relatively stable. The increase in the ratio of new non-performing loans was more marked in certain sectors (accommodation and food service activities, construction, electricity and gas supply, mining and quarrying)
As of late, political risk has not weighed as heavily as expected on investment flows into Colombia. The strong rise in oil prices this year (+50% for a barrel of WTI crude year-to-date) coupled to the country’s distance from the Ukrainian conflict and the Central Bank’s more aggressive stance since January (+300 bps rate hikes) have helped support investment inflows and have trumped, so far, concerns over the high level of uncertainty surrounding the upcoming presidential election (1st round on May 29th). Foreign direct investments (FDI) in the hydrocarbon sector (2/3 of total FDI on average) have continued to recover quite strongly and have not been fazed by the possible interruption of new oil and gas developments – proposed by poll-leading candidate Gustavo Petro
At first glance, higher inflation seems like good news for governments. After all, inflation erodes the real value of debt and lowers the public debt/GDP ratio through a higher nominal GDP. However, the impact of inflation on public finances depends on whether higher inflation was anticipated by financial markets and on its expected persistence. Both factors would influence the borrowing cost and hence the dynamics of the debt ratio through the difference between this cost and nominal GDP growth. Public finances should benefit from having a central bank that is credible in its ability to keep inflation expectations well anchored and is not afraid of tightening policy when inflation has moved well above target
Since its launch, the ECB’s asset purchase programme has had, through various transmission channels, a significant impact on financial markets, activity and inflation. In recent months, doubts about the positive effects of additional purchases and concerns about possible negative consequences have increased. Against this background, the ECB has cut the link between the timing of the end of net asset purchases and the rate lift-off. This is a welcome decision that increases the governing council’s optionality. The new staff macroeconomic projections remind us of the pervasive uncertainty we are facing. In such an environment, monetary policy can be nothing else than data-dependent.
The war in Ukraine has caused a jump in commodity prices that will trigger a further increase in inflation and will weigh on GDP growth. Unsurprisingly, the narrative that stagflation is in for a comeback is gaining ground, as shown by the increasing number of media references to this topic. Stagflation is a multi-year phenomenon of high inflation and a high rate of unemployment. Although inflation is high, the other conditions are clearly not met today. Monitoring financial markets developments is useful in gauging whether stagflation risk is on the rise. This can be done by comparing the developments in breakeven inflation and the high yield corporate bond spread
The war in Ukraine influences the euro area economy through different channels: increased uncertainty, financial market volatility, reduced exports, higher prices for oil, gas and certain other commodities. Although the economic channels of transmission are clear, the size of the impact is not. Counterfactual analysis of last year’s jump in oil and gas prices provides a reference point but the geopolitical nature of the economic shock reduces the reliability of model-based estimates. Moreover, the other transmission channels should also have an impact on growth. Finally, there is a genuine concern that, the longer the crisis lasts, the bigger the economic consequences because eventually, months of elevated uncertainty would end up weighing heavily on household and business confidence.
Investor behaviour is strongly influenced by stylised facts, i.e. the historical relationship between economic variables and financial markets. When Bund yields increase, the spread of certain sovereign issuers tends to widen. This positive correlation will be perpetuated when enough investors believe that the historical relationship continues to hold. This was again illustrated in recent weeks by the significant widening of certain sovereign spreads in reaction to the rise in Bund yields. It creates a challenge for governments, due to higher borrowing costs, but also for the ECB, because of its influence on monetary transmission. This explains the ECB’s insistence on the flexibility offered by the PEPP reinvestments.
Based on Christine Lagarde’s latest press conference, it is clear that the ECB’s Governing Council view on the inflation outlook has evolved quite significantly. Since the December meeting, upside risks to inflation have increased, raising unanimous concern within the Council. Financial markets interpreted this as a signal that the first rate hike might come earlier than previously expected and bond yields moved significantly higher. The ECB’s forward guidance, which can also be considered as a description of its reaction function, suggests a rule-based approach to setting interest rates with clear conditions in terms of inflation outlook and recent price developments. In reality, a lot of judgment will be used as well
Judging by the latest forecasts, the outlook for growth in 2022 is positive and, at some point during the year, inflation should start to decline. Uncertainty remains elevated however so there is a risk that key economic variables evolve differently than anticipated. The biggest ‘known unknown’ concerns the future development of the pandemic. Real GDP growth could surprise to the upside should inflation decline faster than expected. A tightening of financial conditions, more supply disruptions and inflation staying high for longer are the key sources of downside risk to growth.
In his testimony to a commission of the US Senate, Jerome Powell has acknowledged that inflation is less transitory than considered hitherto, adding that, as a consequence, a faster tapering seems warranted. Despite this hawkish tone, the reaction of US Treasuries was muted. This may, amongst other things, reflect concern about how the pandemic might evolve. The new Omicron variant undeniably represents an uncertainty shock for households and companies. It comes on top of a negative supply shock that is already a clear headwind to demand. It clearly makes the task of central banks more complicated than ever when deciding how much of a monetary headwind they can create.
Markets have been pricing in an early lift-off of the ECB’s deposit rate. The ECB argues that, considering its inflation outlook, this is not warranted. This difference in view could reflect a loss of central bank credibility. More likely is that market participants and the ECB disagree on the inflation outlook. Another explanation is that investors focus on the distribution of possible inflation outcomes and are concerned about the risks of inflation surprising to the upside.
Although the significant increase in inflation in most advanced economies is expected to be transitory, it is necessary to focus on the potential consequences of inflation staying temporarily high for longer. Companies that hitherto have been reluctant to raise prices might do so after all, higher inflation could weigh on spending but also cause wage demands to grow, inflation expectations could drift higher, the market sensitivity to growth and inflation surprises would increase and there could be fears about a change in the reaction function of the central bank. In the coming months, investors and central banks will scrutinise data in parallel, but the former will react more quickly should inflation stay high.
Successful market timing between equities and cash requires high skill levels. Very low official interest rates, through their impact on market rates, create a disincentive for doing market timing because they increase the break-even skill level. The same applies for quantitative easing. These considerations are important from a financial stability perspective. Growing investor reluctance to do market timing will probably lead to a decline in equity market volatility and an increase in equity valuations. The former provides a false sense of safety whereas the latter increases the sensitivity to negative news and hence increases the riskiness.
In the early phase of QE, financial markets perceive central bank forward guidance on asset purchases and on policy rates to be closely linked. This generates a mutual reinforcement of both instruments. At a later stage, there may be mounting concern that the signalling works in the other direction as well. Scaling back asset purchases could be interpreted as a signal that a rate hike will follow soon once the net purchases have ended. In the US, Jerome Powell has been very clear that tapering would not signal a change in the outlook for the federal funds rate. In the Eurozone, both types of guidance are explicitly linked. This may complicate the scaling back of asset purchases in view of the impact on rate expectations
Close to 2/3 of public debt in Central America* is owed to non-residents. Costa Rica is the least dependent on external funding. Nicaragua and Panama are the most dependent – however with diametrically opposed creditor profiles. The former’s external commitments are due to official creditors (e.g. multilaterals or bilateral creditors such as Taiwan) while ¾ of the latter’s are owed to private creditors (primary bondholders) – a share comparable to Latin America’s third largest sovereign bond issuer in 2020 – the Dominican Republic. In a context of increasing debt burdens (+12 percentage points across the region in 2020), a high dependence on external funding is a source of financial vulnerability – especially for those countries whose external debt is mostly held by private creditors (e
Foreign investors have significantly increased their purchases of Chinese local bonds since Q2 2020, targeting sovereign papers particularly. In fact, foreigners are currently holding only 3% of the total stock of Chinese local bonds, but 10% of the total stock of central government papers. Foreign investors’ holdings of local bonds increased by RMB 120 bn per month in average from April 2020 to February 2021, against +RMB41 bn in the previous twelve months. This dynamic suddenly stopped last March. It should resume in the short term, yet without returning to the 2020 levels. Several factors account for these recent foreign investment flows: the increase in local yields and the widening spreads with US Treasury yields (yields on Chinese ten-year sovereign bonds rose from 2
In 2020, the Brazilian main equity index – the B3 Ibovespa – recovered swiftly from the commotion caused by the pandemic. After hitting record highs in January, the index lost 50% of its value in March before ending the year on a 3% gain. The year also ended with a record number of initial public offerings (26 IPOs and nearly USD 8 bn in funds raised – the highest level since 2007). The proceeds of these offerings were used to acquire assets or equity interests, cover working capital needs, pay down debt and invest in infrastructure – in that order. Global factors have facilitated this rapid bounce back. Liquidity injections and record low interest rates across the globe in addition to vaccines development helped spur an increase in risk appetite
In first-half 2020, a massive sell-off of treasury bills by non-resident investors (-USD 12 bn starting in March 2020), combined with a decline in tourism revenues, albeit to a lesser extent, triggered a drop-off in the central bank’s foreign reserves. In May, foreign reserves declined by USD 9 bn to USD 36 bn. At the same time, the net external position of commercial banks swung from a surplus of USD 7.2 bn to a deficit of USD 5.4 bn. At the end of May, foreign currency liquidity in the banking system was still at an acceptable level, since official reserves still accounted for 5.8 months of imports of goods and services
The US mortgage market – the epicentre of the 2007-2008 financial crisis – has yet to be reformed. Nearly half of the USD 10,000 billion in housing loans are guaranteed by the Federal government via two private agencies (GSE), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were placed under FHFA conservatorship after they were bailed out in 2008. In recent weeks, there have been growing rumours that the FHFA is seeking to hasten the end of its conservatorship of the two agencies. Accelerating this process risks restricting household access to mortgage loans by prematurely ending the GSE Patch
Although the second wave of the epidemic appears to have peaked in mid-November, the economic outlook, particularly for the labour market, is worrying in Greece as it is in other countries. The consumer unemployment expectations index, published by the European Commission, is deteriorating again, and posted in November its worst reading since August 2013. The hard unemployment data from the Greek statistical service are traditionally lagging: the latest data are for August. Despite managing relatively well the epidemic, the Greek economy has taken a sizeable hit due to the steep decline in tourism, a slowdown that could extend beyond the epidemic phase and hold back the recovery in 2021
The Covid-19 pandemic has led to the most severe recession in Germany’s post-war history. The sudden drop in revenues in combination with only partly adjustable costs has led to a fast depletion of firms’ cash buffers. Business felt compelled to reduce inventories, cancel orders and defer investment projects. This had the effect of deepening the recession. It might be tempting to think that investment could quickly regain traction again, as it did following the Great Recession in 2008-09. This sounds too optimistic. European Investment Bank (EIB) researchers estimate that the European corporate sector could have lost revenue between 13% and 24% of GDP because of the Covid-19 pandemic[1]
Activity indicators for July reflected the continued recovery of the Chinese economy. Real GDP growth already rebounded to 3.2% year-on-year in Q2 2020, up from a 6.8% contraction in Q1. The acceleration in investment growth since March has been driven mainly by public infrastructure projects, the construction and the real estate sectors, which have been supported by the government’s stimulus measures. Manufacturing investment has recovered more slowly, held back by the financial difficulties of corporates, particularly amongst SMEs. In the second half of 2020, investment in public infrastructure is set to remain strong, helped by continued expansionary fiscal policy
