In the US, the ratio between the job openings rate and the unemployment rate remains very elevated. It is one sign amongst many of a very tight labour market. As growth slows down, this ratio should decline. Historically, this has been accompanied by slower wage growth. It can be argued that this time, this process may take more time due to labour hoarding, which should limit the increase in layoffs and hence the unemployment rate, and the high level of the vacancy rate, which should underpin the creation of new jobs. This means that there is a genuine risk of disinflation to be slow.
"España Digital 2026", “Estrategia Española de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2021–2027” and “España 2050”: since the pandemic, there has been no lack of structural programmes designed to increase the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. The Spanish Government is right: the country's fundamental problems, which contributed to the 2011 crisis, persist today. Spain has one of the lowest levels of private and public investment and one of the lowest stocks per capita of productive capital in Europe. In addition, the country still suffers from a significant productivity deficit when compared to its major European partners, a deficit which it is struggling to make up as it is intrinsically linked to its low capital stock
Surprisingly, according to European Commission surveys such as the Standard Poor's Global PMIs, the business climate improved quite significantly in the Eurozone despite the accumulation of setbacks. The improvement was evident in all activity sectors as well as in relation to advanced components (for new orders). However, the level of the surveys remains relatively depressed.
Business climate indicators in recent months have been affected by the significant impact of the energy shock, as well as by fears that this shock will get worse during the winter. The difficulties linked to the international context (before China’s economy opened up again) have also hurt the German economy.
The gradual deterioration in the business climate suggests a slowdown in French growth, which may even have fallen into negative territory in the 4th quarter, a contraction which would be consistent with the decline in the balance of opinions about production in the economic survey in industry.
The obstacles which the Italian economy is facing remain significant. Unlike its European neighbours, inflation in Italy is not slowing down. It fell only slightly in December, from 12.6% to 12.3%, and remains the highest in Western Europe. While the Italian labour market continues to recover given the fall in the unemployment rate, this indicator masks underlying dynamics which are less positive for economic growth.
Most of the measures to freeze energy prices will be maintained in 2023 and the Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez unveiled a new budget of EUR 10 bn intended to support households. This will help to contain food price inflation and counteract the upward pressure on prices caused by the end of the fuel rebate since 1st January 2023.
According to January’s Beige Book published by the Federal Reserve (Fed), economic activity has remained relatively unchanged in all 12 districts since the previous report. However, activity is slowing in the manufacturing sector, despite the mitigation of disruptions in the supply chain. The decline in net real disposable income, combined with higher borrowing costs, is expected to moderate future consumer spending.
According to the latest business surveys, economic activity in the UK continues to contract. According to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), confidence balances in the industrial and distributive trades sectors (retail and wholesale sales) are clearly deteriorating while rebounding slightly in the services sector
Inflation continues to weigh on consumer confidence, while a large proportion of Japanese households will see further increases in the price of electricity next March, with most suppliers having announced price increases from this month.
The state of the labour market occupies a central role in the analysis of the business cycle. Historically, the percentage of months over the past 12 months with nonfarm payrolls below the 200K threshold increases in the run-up to a recession. Today, this indicator stands at 0 percent. Although there have been many false signals, a significant increase in this percentage calls for vigilance, necessitating closer monitoring of other data as well to assess the risk of recession. An alternative approach consists of making the link between monthly payrolls and the unemployment rate. However, given the latest data on job creations, a swift increase in the unemployment rate sufficient to trigger a recession signal seems unlikely
Despite the ongoing good pace of job creation and slower wage increases, which through its impact on inflation could influence future Fed policy, there is enough ambiguity in the recent data to fuel the debate on whether the US will end up in recession or not. The survey of professional forecasters points towards heightened recession risk and so do the inversion of the yield curve and the downtrend of the Conference Board’s index of leading economic indicators. If this index were to decline further, one would expect, based on the past relationship, a significant weakening in the monthly payroll numbers whereby the narrative that a recession is around the corner would gather force.
US growth recovered significantly during Q3, but is expected to slow down during Q4 according to our forecasts. The labour market is still tight, but early signs of a slowdown are emerging. Headline inflation appears to have peaked, but core disinflation remains to be confirmed, which would forced the Federal Reserve (Fed) to continue its monetary policy tightening, even if it means pushing the economy into a recession in 2023. Looking at the budget, compromise will be key when the next deadlines approach, given the divided Congress following the mid-term elections.
Companies in the United States and the euro area continue to struggle to fill vacancies. This will probably make them reluctant to lay off staff when economic conditions worsen, fearing that during the next upturn they would rapidly face new hiring difficulties. By limiting the increase in unemployment, such labour hoarding would be a source of resilience. However, this would be reflected in a decline in labour productivity, which would weigh on profits and could push companies to increase selling prices, thereby slowing the pace of disinflation.
Inflation seems to have peaked in June in the United States. The continuation of the momentum and the pace of disinflation will depend to some extent on easing of the tightness in the labour market, which continues to support wages. In October, the slight increase in the unemployment rate and the slowdown in nonfarm payrolls gains could well indicate the beginning of such easing. What about wage dynamics? According to the Atlanta Federal Reserve’s Wage Growth Tracker, the first signs of a slowdown are emerging. This indicator measures, on a three-month rolling average, the median percent change in the hourly wage of individuals observed 12 months apart. According to this indicator a slowdown in wage growth seems to be emerging, although this is still to be confirmed
Since the start of this year, the European Commission’s industry sentiment survey has seen a significant decline, yet companies continue to report that labour remains a key factor limiting production. This is probably due to order books that remain at record high levels in terms of duration of assured production. Through their impact on the growth of employment and wages, labour market bottlenecks should provide some resilience to consumer spending when the economy is turning down. This support will probably not last however. Hiring intentions of companies have started to decline, which should ease the bottlenecks through a slowdown of employment growth.
According to the preliminary estimate by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), annualised quarterly growth in US GDP rebounded sharply in Q3 to 2.6%, following two quarters of negative growth (respectively -1.6% in Q1 and -0.6% in Q2). The upturn in growth was driven mainly by the significant contribution from foreign trade (2.8 percentage points), which was based on the very strong increase in exports of goods and services (+14.4%), while imports fell sharply (-6.9%). Consumer spending (contribution of one percentage point) is holding up quite well given the extent of the inflationary shock. On the other hand, residential fixed investment continued to fall (for the sixth consecutive quarter) and the downward trend was accentuated (negative contribution of -1.4 percentage points).
The tight US labour market plays a crucial role in the effort of the central bank of bringing inflation back to target. Slower growth in labour income should lead to slower demand growth, whereas smaller wage increases will ease pressure on corporate profit margins and reduce the need for companies to charge higher prices. The labour market is characterized by a dynamic interaction between job openings, unfilled vacancies, voluntary departures (quits) and layoffs. In the US, unfilled vacancies and the quits rate have started to decline and one should expect that this dynamic will gather pace, causing a slowdown in wage growth. The question remains to what extent this will bring down inflation, which is why the Federal Reserve’s policy is completely data-dependent.
Despite a tight labour market, the UK economy is showing clear signs of a slowdown in growth as inflation hits a 40-year high. According to the monthly GDP estimate published by the ONS, on a three-month moving average UK growth was flat in July, marginally below expectations (+0.1%). This zero figure masks more substantial monthly changes: after rising in May (+0.4% m/m), GDP fell in June (-0.6% m/m) before recovering slightly in July (+0.2% m/m). In July, growth in the services sector (+0.4% m/m) was largely offset by new contractions in industry (-0.3%) and construction (-0.8%).
After 2021, a year when wage negotiations were difficult against a backdrop of a fragile and uneven economic recovery, wage increases should be much higher in 2022 but insufficient to compensate workers for high inflation. The country’s most powerful union, IG Metall, has obtained a wage increase which has not been seen in the metalworking sector for 30 years: +6.5%. However, this increase should be put in perspective, since the agreement covers 18 months, bringing the annual growth rate to +4.5% in 2022. Salary negotiations in Germany are still mostly carried out at a centralised level (by industry or sector). The shift in decentralization in the 1990s mainly enabled enterprises to break out of sectoral agreements in exceptional circumstances (e.g
Spain’s labour market is still delivering pleasant surprises, with a net job creation rate of almost 263,000 during the first half of 2022[1]. However, beyond these rising numbers, the major change on the labour market was in recruitment processes in February as a result of employment law reforms, which most notably set out to tighten the conditions for using precarious short-term contracts. These reforms have produced immediate results, with a leap of more than 1,130,000 in the number of permanent contracts since the beginning of the year, which is an increase of 12%. These increases have been particularly large in the accommodation/restaurant (+32.5% over the last six months), construction (+30.8%) and arts and leisure activity (+18
The strength of the employment data reflects a degree of resilience in the Spanish economy in the face of the multiple shocks. According to the Spanish Employment Office (SEPE) an additional 33,366 active workers (+0.2% m/m) were registered in the social security system in May, the thirteenth consecutive month of growth. The government is expecting a further increase in June. Meanwhile, unemployment fell by 41,069 in May, to its lowest level since 2008. This decline was driven by a further drop in youth unemployment (25 and under), of 21,974.
US GDP growth was revised slightly downwards (-0.1 point) for Q1 2022, bringing the contraction in the annualised quarterly growth rate to -1.5%, contrary to expectations of a smaller contraction of only -1.3%. This correction can be attributed to a lower-than-expected private inventory investment (contribution of -1.1 points) as well as to the smaller contribution of investment (+1.2 point), especially residential investment. These revisions were partly offset by an increase in consumer spending of both goods and services (+2.1 points). Increases in exports and imports of goods cancelled each other out, leaving foreign trade’s net contribution unchanged (-3.2 points).
The large victory of António Costa’s Socialist party in February’s legislative elections provides some welcome political stability in the current economic environment. Even though the inflationary shock in Portugal is not as strong as in most of the European countries, and despite support measures introduced by the government, confidence surveys declined sharply in March. It remains to be seen how much this deterioration will alter hiring dynamics. So far, the job market is still on a positive trajectory, with an unemployment rate this winter close to the levels reported in the early 2000s.
