India should report an unprecedented contraction in real GDP this year. The big question is how strong will it rebound thereafter? The rating agencies have begun to doubt whether India will return to its potential growth rate in the years ahead because its economic slowdown began much earlier than the Covid-19 crisis. India’s slowdown dates back at least to 2018, and could even be an extension of the 2009 financial crisis. Since 2014, real GDP growth seems to have been driven solely by positive external shocks, creating the illusion of robust growth. Yet the banking sector is still much too fragile to restore GDP to the growth rates of the past.
The economic rebound expected in H2 2020 has been slow in the making. For the moment, the pandemic seems to be under control, and there have already been several phases of reopening, but domestic demand remains sluggish. Exports also fell sharply again in May. Above all, it is the absence of international tourists that is straining growth prospects, at least in the short term, because fiscal and monetary support measures – though massive – will not suffice to totally absorb the shock. As a result, the recovery is likely to be more restrained than in the other Asian countries.
Like most economies, Japan was hard hit by the Covid-19 crisis in the first half of 2020. The rebound of the Japanese economy will depend notably on an upturn in private consumption, which has been in a slump since year-end 2019. Retail sales plunged sharply again in May, for the third consecutive month. Sales were down 12.3% year-on-year (y/y), after declining 13.9% in April and 4.7% in March [...]
Our barometer shows an improvement in China’s economic momentum during the period between March and May 2020, compared to the preceding three months. This came as no surprise as economic activity collapsed in February, the first month of the lockdown, before beginning a very gradual recovery in March...
Economic activity contracted sharply in February, the first month of the lockdown, before rebounding very gradually in March and April. The recovery is bound to be very slow after this brutal first-quarter shock [...]
China’s population and its economy were the first to be struck by the coronavirus epidemic. Activity contracted abruptly during the month of February before rebounding thereafter at a very gradual pace. Although the situation on the supply side is expected to return to normal in Q2, the demand shock will persist. Domestic investment and consumption will suffer from the effects of lost household and corporate revenues while world demand is falling. The authorities still have substantial resources to intervene to help restart the economy. Central government finances are not threatened. However, after the shock to GDP growth, the expected upsurge in domestic debt ratios will once again aggravate vulnerabilities in the financial sector.
India was not spared the coronavirus pandemic. The economic slowdown will be all the more severe with a protracted lockdown of the population. The government also lacks the fiscal capacity of the other Asian countries to bolster its economy. Already strained by the economic slowdown of the past two years, public finances are bound to deteriorate further. Public debt could reach 75% of GDP by 2022. Refinancing risks are low, but the cost of borrowing could rise for the long term if the rating agencies were to sanction its public debt and deficit overruns. India still has sufficient foreign reserves to cover its short-term liabilities.
The COVID-19 crisis will have a huge impact on an economy that was already weakened slightly by the slowdown in global trade in 2019. Yet Indonesia’s macroeconomic fundamentals are strong: its public finances are solid, the banking sector is robust and both companies and households have very little debt. The country has sufficient foreign reserves to cover its short-term financing needs. Yet the rupiah is bound to remain under fierce downward pressure: the current account deficit is only partially financed by foreign direct investment, and capital outflows have reached unprecedented levels since 31 January.
The coronavirus crisis has hit a fast-growing economy, which expanded by more than 6% year-on-year in H2 2019 and looked set to continue at the same pace in 2020. The pandemic and the very strict lockdown imposed by the Duterte government will cause all the engines of growth to seize up: production will stop in the country’s economic centre, the fall in domestic demand will be exacerbated by reductions in remittances from workers abroad and losses in the informal economy, tourism will collapse and exports of goods and services will follow suit. This is a substantial shock, but the strong macroeconomic fundamentals and the modest level of government debt give the authorities scope to introduce support measures.
The Covid-19 pandemic strikes an economy that has already been weakened by several quarters of decline in merchandise exports, tourism, private consumption and investment. Since February, the government has launched a major fiscal stimulus plan representing about 10% of GDP. The plan includes direct support measures in favour of corporates and households. Additional structural measures will be needed going forward, in order to fuel a sustainable rebound in private demand and bolster medium-term economic growth prospects. Thanks to abundant fiscal reserves and minimal debt, the government has comfortable manoeuvring room to pursue an expansionist policy for several years to come.
Private consumption has played a greater role in the Chinese economy in recent years, but this growth engine remains fragile. At a time when the export sector is hurt by US protectionist measures and weak global demand, China is seeking other solid sources of growth. Yet private consumption growth is slowing and is likely to be disappointing in the short and medium terms. A catching-up dynamic should continue, supported by urbanization, an ageing population and action of the government, which strives to reduce income inequality, improve housing affordability and further strengthen the social protection system. owever, these structural changes will take time
Narendra Modi’s term as India’s prime minister has been broadly positive economically. In the last five years, he has pushed through some important reforms, taking advantage of his majority in the lower house of Parliament. However, to achieve a significant increase in GDP per-capita and reduce India’s vulnerability to external shocks, it is necessary to carry out further reforms in order to create a more conducive environment for domestic and foreign investment. The latest polls suggest that no party could win a majority in the lower house of Parliament in the general election scheduled for April and May. Mr Modi’s party still looks likely to win the most seats, but could be forced to govern alongside the Congress Party
Vulnerabilities in the Chinese financial sector have increased significantly in the past decade. Given the high level and multiple sources of credit and liquidity risks and the opacity of both shadow banking activities and links between banks and non-bank institutions, containing these vulnerabilities poses a major challenge for the authorities. Measures recently taken to tighten monetary conditions and continued efforts to strengthen financial-sector supervision are positive actions. However, they could also weigh on economic activity, and the government’s resolve to stay the course on slowing the growth of domestic debt should soon be put to the test once again.
For Narendra Modi, everything seems to be going his way. In 2016, India’s economy reported one of the strongest GDP growth rates, macroeconomic fundamentals have consolidated, reforms are advancing and Modi’s party won a major victory in the most recent legislative elections. Yet the government must now deal with the deterioration in India’s public-sector banks, which is hampering loan distribution and holding back corporate investment. The authorities intend to create a centralised special purpose vehicle, but public funding of a bad bank risks undermining the current fiscal consolidation movement.
Malaysia has been relatively resilient to shocks in recent years thanks to a unique growth model built around three pillars: political and social stability, economic interventionism – which has fuelled the country's industrialisation – and international expansion. Yet at a time when economic policy has little manoeuvring room and global trade is slowing down, Malaysia's growth model has to face new challenges if the country is to join the ranks of the high-income countries by 2020.
