Eco Week
Editorial

The Global Economy’s Resilience to Shocks: Four Observations and Three Intertwined Questions

11/16/2026
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A review of the latest economic indicators reveals four key observations. First, the global economy continues to show resilience in the face of the energy shock, which has recently been compounded by the impact of rising long-term interest rates. Second, this resilience still relies heavily on the global investment cycle, but not exclusively: household consumption also provides support. Albeit on a more or less strong footing depending on the country, its contribution to growth is non-negligible. Third, the rise in inflation remains primarily energy-driven, with the United States standing out unfavorably from the Eurozone due to a more entrenched and persistent problem. Fourth, the rise in long-term government yields is placing a significant, well-identified, yet manageable strain on public finances. Three intertwined questions arise regarding the rise in long-term interest rates: How high can they go? Will growth continue to hold up against all odds? How will central banks react?

First observation: The global economy continues to weather the energy shock without breaking

The surge in energy prices following the outbreak of the Middle East conflict in late February has had a smaller impact on economic activity than the 2022 energy shock caused by the invasion of Ukraine[1]. Although the price of a barrel of Brent crude once again (and largely so) crossed the USD 100 threshold in October while European natural gas prices (TTF) remain under pressure as winter approaches, the macroeconomic shockwave has remained much more contained than four years ago. According to business climate surveys in the Eurozone and the United States, the manufacturing sector has weathered the shock remarkably well, while the impact was more visible in the services sector and on consumer confidence before an improvement set in. In October, the overall picture remains positive: while there are signs of erosion, they remain contained. The PMI/ISM indices remain above the 50-point expansion threshold — clearly so in the US, and to a slightly lesser extent in Europe. Emerging economies have also shown resilience, thereby fueling global growth. Non-resident portfolio investment flows have certainly been highly volatile since the outbreak of the conflict in Iran, but financing conditions have held up despite pressures on energy prices and interest rates in advanced economies, and the aggregate manufacturing PMI index for the fifteen major emerging economies has nearly returned to its February 2026 level since September.

Second observation: The supportive role of household consumption, in the shadow of the investment cycle

In the current business cycle, there is much more talk of corporate investment than of household consumption. The former is indeed riding high, driven by several mutually reinforcing trends: the AI boom, increased military spending, decarbonization and electrification efforts, and Germany’s massive infrastructure plan. As a result, this investment engine appears immune — or at least less sensitive, at the aggregate level — to the energy shock than household consumption. Income and financing constraints appear to be more severe for household consumption. This is evident in household confidence, which certainly does not reflect the same level of optimism as business climate indicators. And yet, while they show little confidence, they are quite spendthrift, particularly in the United States. Across the Atlantic, the current investment cycle is certainly a major driver of growth, closely trailing that of household consumption. However, until the second quarter of 2026, household consumption retained its role as the primary driver, as having the largest contribution to growth (see chart). And while it was dethroned in the third quarter according to currently available data, its support remains very much present and substantial.

AI-related investment rivals the US consumer as the key US growth engine

Household consumption in the Eurozone certainly does not show the same momentum: on a quarterly average, from the first quarter of 2023 through the second quarter of 2026, it grew nearly half as fast as in the United States (0.34% vs. 0.66%). Nevertheless, it remains the dominant driver of growth in the Eurozone (with a contribution amounting to 0.2pp, or 71%, compared with half a percentage point for total investment), without the same wealth effect as in the United States and without a decline in the savings rate, which leaves it with greater potential for improvement.

Third observation: The rise in inflation remains mostly energy-driven but appears more entrenched across the Atlantic

On the inflation front, the rise continues to be primarily energy-driven, even though it appears more entrenched in the United States, and initial signs of pass-through — notably via producer prices — will be closely monitored, while overall upward pressures remain strong[2]. In the Eurozone, where harmonised inflation reached 4.0% year-on-year in October 2026, energy accounts for nearly half of the rise in prices. Core inflation remains contained (at 2.6% y/y), as do all alternative indicators, including inflation expectations. The situation in the United States, however, calls for increased vigilance. While headline inflation (3.7% y/y in September according to the CPI) is lower than the Eurozone October print, the underlying problem is more profound: core inflation is picking up again, and nearly 60% of the components of the US consumer price basket are rising by more than 3% (compared with 43% in the Eurozone).

Fourth observation: The rise in long-term rates adds a new, significant but manageable constraint on public finances

The return of 10-year sovereign yields to levels not seen in 25 years — nearing 5% in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in France — brings back to the forefront a constraint that had previously faded: debt service, while the state of public finances is generally worse today than it was a quarter-century ago, with budgets under heavy strain and facing difficult trade-offs[3]. Among the trends to watch, the spread between the implicit interest rate on debt and nominal GDP growth — which has long been favorable (i.e. negative) — is set to reverse by the end of the decade in most European economies. It would remain negative but narrow significantly in Spain and the United States, with Japan standing out as the exception, still enjoying a significantly favorable spread. Another trend to watch is the magnitude of the increase in the interest burden by 2032, which is forecasted to double, for example, in France, Germany, and Japan, and reach 5% of GDP in the United States.

Nevertheless, this additional constraint remains manageable in the short and medium term thanks to two factors: i/ the protective inertia of the average debt maturity when it is high, as is the case in the Eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom; ii/ the onset of gradual fiscal consolidation in most European countries (except in Germany, which is implementing an investment stimulus program). The projected trajectories are, however, demanding and subject to political uncertainties. But at least there is a stated commitment to reducing fiscal imbalances. This is not the case in the United States, where, in addition, the relatively short average maturity of the debt exposes the country to a faster pass-through of rate hikes to debt service.

Three intertwined questions surrounding the rise in long-term rates

The rise in long-term sovereign rates has multiple causes, some of which are positive (resilient growth, the AI boom, risk appetite). Furthermore, for now, it remains broadly warranted and orderly. And as long as this rise occurs alongside a rally in equity markets, overall financial conditions are not particularly tightened as a result.

Since the rise in long-term rates is driven by multiple factors, we should expect them to remain, at a minimum, at a high level or even to rise further, even if some of the factors that have recently pushed them higher begin to subside. According to our forecasts, the bulk of the rise is likely behind us, as yields already factor in the resilience of growth and residual monetary tightening. Long-term rates could then begin to decline as fiscal consolidation gains credibility.

The recent turbulence in the tech sector has, however, shown that what is gained on one front (reduced pressure on long-term rates as safe-haven bonds regain favor) immediately creates another problem (increased downside risk to economic activity from a reversal of the AI boom). What matters for growth is the overall trend in monetary and financial conditions, including access to bank credit. Recent data point to first signs of tighter conditions, but from a favorable starting point, and this tightening is helpful to dampen demand and curb associated inflation. As long as it remains contained — which is the most likely scenario at present — it should only moderately dampen growth momentum without jeopardizing it. In France, for example, we will continue to monitor this interplay between tailwinds and headwinds through the cross-dynamics of business start-ups and bankruptcies[4].

Nonetheless, the bulk of these questions presents a new conundrum for central banks: to what extent should they accommodate the rise in long-term rates, and to what extent does this rise interfere with the conduct of monetary policy? Positively, by improving transmission? But then, to what extent can they rely on this rise to do part of the job without fueling the rise excessively (by tightening too much or too little)? Or negatively, by leading to an excessive tightening of financial conditions and access to credit? All of this argues in favor of the very measured approach adopted so far by central banks, particularly the Fed and the ECB. Further hikes in policy rates are to be expected, but rather a few ones than a lot, in order to fine-tune and support the current growth cycle for as long as possible.

[1] See Energy shock: Dashboard 2026 vs. 2022 - November 2026– Economic Research – BNP Paribas, November 13, 2026.

[2] See Inflation tracker - November 2026– Economic Research – BNP Paribas, November 12, 2026.

[3] See Eco Charts Public Finances 2026– Economic Research – BNP Paribas, November 5, 2026.

[4] See EcoCharts | Business creations and bankruptcies - Partial update with monthly data as of September 2026, November 13, 2026.

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