Climate has always varied. As the Earth has no fixed orbit or inclination (it is influenced by the other planets in the solar system, such as Jupiter and Saturn), its surface temperature evolves with the quantities of radiative energy that reach it, determining, for example, the great glaciation cycles of the Quaternary. Like a time-machine, paleoclimatology (the analysis of ocean or glacial cores) traces past climate fluctuations with increasing precision, from the appearance of homo sapiens around 300,000 years ago, and well beyond.
GDP growth, inflation, interest and exchange rates.
It is highly likely that this year the ECB will cut its policy rate before the Fed does. This sequencing has become a topic of debate amongst central bank watchers, as if the ECB would be jumping the queue and refuse to wait in line until the Fed has eased policy. Does it matter if the ECB cuts rates before the Fed? The answer is no.
In the first quarter, economic growth in Central European countries improved as expected (Poland: +0.4% q/q in Q1 2024; Hungary: +0.8% q/q; Czech Republic: +0.5% q/q; Slovakia: +0.7% q/q; Romania: +0.5%). Although details of the accounts are not yet available, there is strong evidence that growth was primarily driven by consumption, as reflected by the boost in retail sales.
In the US, in an environment of aggressive monetary tightening, the resilience of companies has contributed to the resilience of the economy in general through various channels -staffing levels, investments, growth of profits and dividends, etc.-. Companies’ resilience has been underpinned by different financial factors: company profitability, cash levels accumulated during the Covid-19 pandemic, the ease of capital markets-based funding, low long-term rates that had been locked in during the pandemic. Finally, the growing role of intangible investments also plays a role because they are less sensitive to interest rates, thereby weakening monetary transmission.
In the United States, economic policy uncertainty based on media coverage increased in April for the second time in a row. There appears to be a correlation between this result and the spillover from the disappointing inflation data in the first quarter, which caused various players (central banks and markets) to postpone and drastically reduce their rate cut expectations for the year. In addition, according to the Chair of the Fed, inflation remains high and the restrictive policy will need to be kept in place even longer in order to keep progressing towards the 2% target.
GDP growth, inflation, exchange and interest rates.
Some common inflation trajectories emerge between the different economic blocs: disinflation of food and manufactured goods continues, while energy deflation has largely abated, except in the United Kingdom. Apart from Japan, price pressure indicators (supply side) have rebounded in recent months (page 19) while wage growth is currently higher than inflation in all the regions (page 27).In the United States, CPI inflation fell slightly, from 3.5% in year-on-year terms in March to 3.4% in April, while the core rate fell from 3.8% to 3.6%. Deflation in used vehicles (from -2.2% in March to -6.9%) contributed mainly to this decline. On the other hand, services inflation remained stable at 5.3%
In April, the S&P Global composite PMI index for worldwide business activity rose again slightly (+0.1 points) reaching its highest level since July 2023 (52.4). This rise results from the increase in services, with the associated PMI hitting its highest level since July 2023 (52.7, compared to 52.4 in March). Conversely, the manufacturing index fell slightly in April (50.3, -0.3pp), following three months of growth. However, it is still in expansionary territory.
GDP growth, inflation, exchange and interest rates
The message following the FOMC meeting of 30 April-1May, was unambiguous. It will take longer than expected to reach the point of confidence on the inflation outlook that would warrant a cut in the federal funds rate. Consequently, we are back in a ‘high for long’ environment for the federal funds rate, like in the fall of last year. At the current juncture the key question is whether the economy can remain as resilient if the federal funds rate stays at its current level until the latter part of the year, or even longer, or whether the risk of a hard landing is increasing
The debate on monetary sovereignty in emerging countries is resurfacing with, on the one hand, the plan of Argentinian President Javier Milei to dollarise his economy, and on the other, the temptation of several West African country leaders to abandon the CFA franc. From a strictly economic point of view, dollarisation is effective in tackling hyperinflation. However, to be sustainable in the long term, it imposes severe constraints on fiscal policy and the nature of foreign investment. Conversely, the abandonment of the CFA franc with the aim of recovering the flexibility of an unpegged exchange rate regime and greater autonomy of monetary policy, is an argument that is either weak in theory or unconvincing in practice, even in the short term.
For any country, carbon footprint is measured not only by what it produces, but also by what it imports. Of the 9.2 tons of greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted annually by each French person, more than half (5.1 tons) are attributable to goods and services purchased abroad.
According to the IMF’s latest Fiscal Monitor, between 2023 and 2029, many advanced economies are projected to see an increase in their public sector debt to GDP ratio. The US ranks second in terms of increase of the public debt ratio (+ 11.7 percentage points of GDP). Administration and Congress will have no other option than to structurally reduce the budget deficit. However, the challenge will be huge given the unpopularity of tax increases, the difficulty of cutting expenditures and the major headwinds of rising interest charges and, in the medium run, slower GDP growth. Whether the US manages to bring its public finances under control also matters for the rest of the world, given the central role of the US Treasury market and the US dollar in the global financial system
L’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) a publié en avril son dernier jeu de prévisions dont le message est plutôt positif1. Après un repli de 1,2% en 2023, le volume des échanges mondiaux en biens rebondirait de 2,6% en 2024, une progression peu ou prou en ligne avec la croissance de l’économie mondiale, attendue par l’OMC à 2,7%. Parmi les principaux soutiens au commerce mondial, l’organisation de Genève met en avant la baisse anticipée de l’inflation en 2024 et 2025. Celle-ci permettrait de soutenir le pouvoir d’achat et, par conséquent, la consommation de biens manufacturés.
Historically there is a very close correlation between changes in US Treasury yields and German Bund yields. This is relevant at the current juncture, considering that the recent hawkish twist in the tone of the Federal Reserve might continue to push US long-term interest rates higher and put upward pressure on bond yields in the Eurozone. However, since the start of the year, the increase in Bund yields is lower than expected based on the past statistical relationship. This probably reflects a conviction by investors that the ECB will start cutting its policy rate earlier than the Federal Reserve. This monetary desynchronisation is linked to a notable difference in terms of inflation with the US
News about growth, inflation and monetary policy influences bond and equity markets. For bonds, the relationship is straightforward but for equities, the relationship is more complex. Therefore, the correlation between bond prices and equity prices fluctuates over time. Since 2000 it has been predominantly negative, thereby creating a diversification effect. It underpins the demand for bonds, even when yields are very low. Unsurprisingly, during the recent Federal Reserve tightening cycle, the correlation has turned positive again. Based on past experience, one would expect that, as the Federal Reserve starts cutting rates later this year, the bond-equity correlation would turn negative again.
2024 should be the year of the start of the easing cycle by the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of England, primarily to accompany the easing of inflation. However, the timing of the first cut remains uncertain, as does the number of expected cuts. Conditions for a first rate cut in June seem to be in place for the ECB, which, according to our forecasts, would thus act before the Fed, whose first rate cut is expected in July (instead of June previously). The possibility is rising that the Fed will not cut rates at all this year because of the resilience of growth and inflation. Such a prolonged Fed monetary status quo could have more negative than positive consequences.
US inflation March figure, again higher than expected, put an end to our scenario of a simultaneous first rate cut by the Fed, the ECB, and the BoE in June. We now expect only two rate cuts by the Fed this year, the first in July and the second one in December. The possibility is even rising that the Fed will not cut rates at all this year. On the ECB’s side, we maintain our expectation that the first cut will occur in June, but we have ruled out our back-to-back cuts forecast (i.e. June, July and September), favouring a more gradual easing of one cut per quarter (in June, September and December). The ECB would end up cutting rates before the Fed.
In the United States, economic policy uncertainty, based on media coverage, resumed rising modestly in March, following a marked decline in February. This increase can be attributed, in part, to the February inflation figure (3.2% year-on-year according to the BLS consumer price index). By exceeding consensus expectations (3.1%), this negative surprise further pushes back the prospect of Fed policy easing.
Despite the rebound in the United States, inflation continues overall to slow in the G7 countries and in the euro area as a whole. In Japan, keeping consumer prices above 2% will remain complicated in the short term, due to the loss of momentum observed this winter: inflation rebounded in February due to base effects, but the 3m/3M annualised rate fell back to 1.3%. The decline in the 3m/3m annualised rate is more marked in services, down to only 0.4%. The wage increase granted following the annual wage negotiations (Shunto): 5.3% in total, including 3.7% in base salary, will nevertheless support the BoJ in its (very gradual) attempt to normalise monetary policy
