Putting a number on the consequences of the coronavirus is a huge challenge. On some of the topics we have a satisfactory level of visibility of the order of magnitude: international spillover effects of the demand shock, repercussions of the global increase in uncertainty. The visibility is much lower concerning the effects of the supply disruption. This is even more the case for the impact on China. In the near term, data surprises –the difference between the consensus forecast and the outcome- should be higher than normal. However, provided that the peak of the epidemic is reached quickly, visibility should improve quickly and hence support confidence.
Population ageing creates major challenges for PAYG retirement systems in the OECD countries. Reforms are needed to their sustainability. These reforms have taken two directions: lower benefits or the extension of the retirement age. Based on current regulations, in most countries, benefits will be less generous for future cohorts. In Poland, replacement rates - the percentage of an individual's latest employment income that is replaced by a pension benefit upon retirement - could be more than halved compared to those retiring now. Another possibility is the lengthening of the normal pension age. Countries that have linked the pension age to life expectancy will be able to maintain benefits at a relatively high level
From an economic perspective, the coronavirus epidemic represents a combination of a demand, a supply and an uncertainty shock. The weight of China in world economy, its contribution to global GDP growth and its role in global value chains imply that the international repercussions are more far-reaching than during the SARS crisis in 2003.We have to brace for poor data in February and March, so the real test is whether April sees a pick-up in business surveys. Absence thereof would fuel concerns that the impact is more lasting in nature which would put us in a U-type scenario. An L-type scenario looks unlikely as yet whereas a V-type recovery would supposes a swift decline in new cases.
Recent survey data have picked up, in particular in the manufacturing sector and in terms of export orders. The European Commission noted a marked increase of economic sentiment in the European Union, the eurozone, Germany and France in January, after substantial weakness in Q4. Although economists expect a pick-up in growth in the US as the year progresses, the dispersion is very wide. This means that the median forecast will inspire less confidence than if the level of disagreement amongst forecasters would be lower.
In recent months, the global manufacturing cycle has been bottoming out whereas in services a slight uptick has been noted. In addition, two major sources of uncertainty have seen a positive development: the US and China signed a trade deal and the UK and the European Union can at last start negotiations about their future relationship. Very accommodative central bank policy has contributed to buoyant market sentiment. The combination of these three factors - stabilisation of business sentiment, decline in uncertainty, supportive financial environment - implies conditions are met to see some uptick in growth. Nevertheless, caution prevails in this assessment, if only because later on this year, uncertainty may very well increase again.
The US-China trade deal has brought relief. It avoids new tariff increases by the US with the risk of further escalation. The deal should be welcomed in China, given its ongoing growth slowdown, but also in the US where companies had increasingly expressed their concern about the trade confrontation The rest of the world will monitor closely the extent of trade diversion which could follow from the agreement. Attention will now shift to the phase 2 negotiations, which could very well mean that trade uncertainty will intensify at some stage.
There is a considerable gap between what are considered to be the geopolitical ramifications of the escalating tensions between the US and Iran since the start of the year and the subdued reaction of markets. The market reaction probably reflects the investors’ view that the probability-weighted impact on growth should be very limited because the risk of a major escalation is considered to be small and/or because of an expectation that the impact of higher oil prices on the economy is limited. What also may play a role in the market reaction thus far is that, leaving the geopolitical uncertainty aside, the economic environment is considered to be conducive to taking risk: stabilisation of survey data, reduction in trade-related uncertainty and accommodative monetary policy.
Cities today concentrate more than half of the world population and more than 80% of global GDP. The underlying dynamics explaining their ever increasing importance are the result of a variety of positive externalities (thicker labor markets, knowledge spillovers, input sharing…) generating self-reinforcing effects. These rapid waves of urbanization have key implications for the production of goods and services, environmental quality and human development. The world is one of density spikes and disparities, driven by the unstoppable ascendance of metropolises. Greener and more inclusive cities should be promoted in order for them to remain livable. In this respect, public policies have an important role to play
2019 has been dominated by uncertainty, in particular about trade tensions and hard Brexit risk, as well as mounting concern about the slowdown of the global economy. his has led to additional policy easing by the ECB whereas the Federal Reserve has reversed course by cutting the federal funds rate on several occasions. This has further reduced the remaining policy leeway of central banks, a subject that will be analysed in the context of the strategic reviews by the Fed and the ECB. It has also led to increased calls for fiscal stimulus. Equity markets have delivered surprisingly strong returns with investors preferring to look at the role of lower interest rates, rather than at the weakening of the profits outlook
We monitor uncertainty by means of different metrics and several have eased as of late. Starting top left and moving clockwise, the economic policy uncertainty index, which is based on media coverage, has declined although it remains at a high level...
Based on business surveys, the cyclical environment, globally, seems to have stabilised. A similar picture emerges for the eurozone and China, whereas in the US it is mixed. Stability’ characterises the monetary policy outlook. After the announcements in September, the ECB can afford to wait before making a judgment of the effectiveness of its policy stance. For the Federal Reserve, it seems that the bar for envisaging a change in the federal funds rate is high, even more so when it’s about considering a rate hike. Stabilisation of economic data and a stable, very accommodative monetary stance provide reasons for being hopeful, but this supposes that uncertainty doesn’t increase again. In this respect, unfortunately, the situation remains very opaque
Certain gases in the atmosphere, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), are largely opaque to the Earth’s infrared radiation and keep heat at the Earth’s surface trapped, like a lid. This is the greenhouse effect, identified in 1824 by French mathematician Joseph Fourier. Its intensity has always varied, but human activity has caused it to disrupt. Since the pre-industrial era – generally accepted as the period from 1850 to 1900 – human activity has caused 2,000 billion tonnes of CO2 to be released into the atmosphere, increasing the Earth’s temperature by 1°C. That increase is now accelerating. It will reach 3-5°C by 2100 if carbon emissions continue at their current trend. Few species can adapt to that rate of change, which is a hundred times faster than during interglacial periods of warming
Recent business surveys such as the purchasing managers’ indices, point towards a broad-based stabilisation in October. This is a welcome development after a prolonged downward trend. However, in a historical perspective, the recent readings are low or, looking at the manufacturing sector, very low. This points to an ongoing subdued growth environment. Going forward, a sideways movement of these surveys should increase the likelihood of a growth acceleration: when the frequency of bad news drops, confidence should eventually rebound, fuelling spending, all the more so given the very accommodative financial and monetary conditions.
Revenue of older people mainly consists of state and occupational pensions and income from savings and work. In countries that have, relatively speaking, more generous pension benefits, labour participation of the elderly is relatively low. In France, only 3% of people older than 65 still work, compared to almost 20% in the US and 25% in Japan. Moreover, the French old age poverty rate, the percentage of seniors (66+) whose income is lower than 50% of the median household income, is among the lowest in the OECD. The chart shows that, in general, there is a positive relationship between the percentage of revenue of older people coming from work and their at-risk-of-poverty rate. It thus seems that, when seniors feel financially constrained, they decide to work longer
The US-China trade conflict and Brexit have been acting as a headwind for growth for a considerable time now. Recent developments have raised expectations that these sources of uncertainty may have peaked. Should it turn out to be the case, this could spur spending by unleashing pent-up demand by companies or households. However, in an environment of slowing global growth and, quoting the IMF, a precarious outlook for next year, we probably will see a more limited reaction, with other sources of concern taking over from the previous ones: uncertainty make have peaked in certain areas, but is likely to migrate to other.
According to the IMF’s chief economist, the growth outlook is precarious. Although the Fund expects somewhat of a pick-up of growth next year, this is driven by a small group of emerging and developing economies which are currently under stress or underperforming. The modest growth acceleration reflects country-specific factors, rather than the expectation of a broad-based improvement. In the US, the growth slowdown is expected to continue well beyond 2020 and Chinese growth is projected to decline to 5.8% next year. Against this background, the projected slight pick-up in the eurozone, driven by Germany and Italy, and which supposes that external demand regains some momentum, looks challenging.
We monitor uncertainty by means of different metrics. Starting top left and moving clockwise, the economic policy uncertainty index, which is based on media coverage, is at a historical high, on the back of US-China trade tensions and fears about a disorderly Brexit. The recent trade deal between the US and China, although of a very limited scope, and the agreement between the UK government and the European Union on Brexit, have fuelled hope that uncertainty will abate in the near term. This obviously remains to be seen...
The usefulness of carbon pricing lies in the abatement incentives that it creates. An implicit carbon price can be derived by dividing the revenues from carbon pricing systems and excise taxes on fuels by the total greenhouse gas emissions. According to this method, prices range from close to 0 in most developing countries but also the US and Canada, to close to 100 euro for 1 tonne carbon emitted in Sweden and Switzerland. The chart confirms that the countries that have relatively high implicit carbon prices also rank high in terms of carbon productivity defined as the amount of GDP produced per unit of carbon emissions. This suggests that in order to increase carbon productivity, i.e
The slowdown of global growth has gathered pace, forcing the Federal Reserve to cut the federal funds rate on two occasions, whereas the ECB has announced a comprehensive easing package. Nevertheless, the slowdown is expected to continue. Uncertainty is pervasive. Companies question the true state of demand faced with slower growth, trade disputes, Brexit worries, geopolitical risk. Corporate investment suffers and may impact households via slower employment growth. The room to boost growth via monetary policy and, in many countries, fiscal policy has become limited, and this is another factor which could weigh on confidence. Surveys of US corporate executives point towards high concern about recession risk and the US yield curve inversion adds to the unease
The Federal Reserve and the ECB are in very different positions: the former has more room to ease policy and it is also closer to its policy targets. The ECB has limited remaining policy leeway but is confronted with an inflation shortfall versus its aim and a risk that this gap would increase, rather than narrow. These differences have led to diverging approaches in the conduct of and communication about monetary policy. The Fed is data-dependent and, except for the projections of the FOMC members, offers no guidance. The ECB is agnostic about the data and builds its communication around state-dependent forward guidance: policy tightening will be solely conditioned by meeting its target
Business surveys in the US paint a diverging picture: manufacturing is worsening significantly but services have picked up nicely. Taking a broader perspective, evidence is building of a slowing economy. Less dynamic growth can be observed in engines of growth of the world economy: China and India, although reasons differ. In Europe, Germany is probably already in a technical recession whereas France is resilient. Central banks are back in easing mode but the effectiveness will be hampered by elevated uncertainty, despite the announcement of a new round of trade negotiations between the US and China.
Growth concerns for both advanced countries and emerging countries have picked up again on the back of a collection of new economic data but also — and perhaps more importantly — due to continued high uncertainty. The latter stems from escalating tensions between the US and China over trade. The effects of this confrontation already show up in the Chinese data while in the US, mounting anecdotal evidence also point to its detrimental impact on business and the agricultural sector. The Federal Reserve has turned a corner and indicated that rate cuts are coming, much to the joy of the equity market. The ECB has also changed its message: with risks tilted to the downside and inflation going nowhere, it considers more easing is necessary.
Fed Chairman Powell, in his address to Congress this week, has confirmed that easing is coming. In June, ECB President Draghi provided similar hints. This comes on the back of growing concerns regarding global growth and ultimately facing too low a level of inflation. Risks may be mounting, but, on the other hand, the unemployment rate is close to the natural rate. There are reasons to assume that monetary easing under full employment would be less effective than when the economy is marred in recession. Monetary easing could also raise concerns about financial stability, which, if unaddressed, could weigh on the ability of monetary policy to successfully boost inflation.
A sigh of relief followed the publication of first quarter GDP data. However since, growth concerns have picked up again on the back of a collection of new economic data but also — and perhaps more importantly — due to continued high uncertainty. The latter stems from concerns over the extent of the slowdown and its consequences in terms of economic risks. It also emanates from escalating tensions between the US and China over trade. The effects of this confrontation already show up in the Chinese data while in the US, mounting anecdotal evidence also point to its detrimental impact on business and the agricultural sector. The Federal Reserve has turned a corner and indicated that rate cuts are coming, much to the joy of the equity market
A high level of uncertainty can act as a drag on growth. Whether monetary easing will succeed in boosting growth will depend on the nature of uncertainty. Endogenous uncertainty follows from the normal development of the business cycle and rate cuts should succeed in reducing this uncertainty by boosting confidence of economic agents. Exogenous uncertainty is not driven by the business cycle but is triggered by other factors, such as, in the current environment, ongoing trade disputes. In this case, monetary policy effectiveness suffers and, despite rate cuts, the growth slowdown should continue until its root cause (exogenous uncertainty) is addressed.