Eco Perspectives

Monetary easing, political unease

09/30/2020
PDF

The US economy, like nearly every other economy, was partially paralysed in spring 2020 due to lockdown measures introduced to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. US GDP plummeted by an unprecedented 9.1% in Q2 2020 (an annualised rate of 31.7%). Business nonetheless managed to recover thanks to the brief respite offered by the disease and massive support from the Federal government, with transfers of roughly USD 2,200 billion over the past six months, nearly the equivalent of France’s GDP[1]. As fall approaches, household and corporate economic surveys have returned to quasi-normal levels. According to estimates by the Atlanta and New York Federal Reserve Banks, GDP rebounded between 6% and 7% in the third quarter.

An incomplete and inequitable recovery

That leaves a shortfall of 4-5 percentage points of GDP relative to 2019 levels, which is less than in Europe but still a considerable gap to close. Whereas unemployment figures need to be approached with caution (see box), job statistics probably paint the most realistic picture of the severity of the shock. Available through August, it shows that only half of the 22 million jobs destroyed between March and April have been restored. Although it cannot be compared with the 2008 financial crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic has had similarly profound and inequitable repercussions on the labour market.

GROWTH AND INFLATION (%)
ACTIVE POPULATION WITHOUT A COLLEGE DIPLOMA

Two thirds of the job losses reported since February have hit unskilled and low-income populations. This is also where we find the highest concentration of people experiencing difficulties enrolling in the unemployment insurance system[2]. As a result, numerous low-income Americans have been excluded from the labour force. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows an historic decline in the participation rate for adults without a diploma[3], and this decline cannot be seen in the rest of the population, at least not to the same extent. Since February, nearly 4 million people have already left the labour market (see chart), and this exodus from the radar screen can have unexpected effects on certain macroeconomic variables. This is the case for hourly wages, for example, where the buoyant rise recently (+6.6% year-on-year in Q2) is due less to the enrichment of American workers than to a reduction in working hours and to the underrepresentation of the poorest categories[4]. There are no inflationary pressures, to the contrary: increasingly fierce competition and the need to slash inventory have tended to pull down consumer prices in recent months[5].

The recovery is also unequal not only by population but also by sector. Unsurprisingly, the sectors that have preserved or returned to quasi-normal levels of business and employment are those with a large domestic footprint (residential construction, utilities, food retailing etc.), or specifically requested during the crisis (computer equipment, financial services, telecommunications, etc.). In contrast, the situation is still very difficult in sectors that depend on international trade and/or imply large crowds or physical contact. Hotel and food services, leisure and the performing arts, transport industries and services, and clothing together account for 15% of total US employment, but about half of the job losses since February.

Monetary easing, political unease

A full recovery should not be expected soon. Most countries are experiencing resurgence in Covid-19 cases and international trade is far from showing a return to normal. Aware of difficulties, the Fed has embarked on a policy shift. At the Jackson Hole Symposium in late August, Fed chairman Jerome Powell unveiled new longer-term monetary policy targets and strategy that seem to herald in a system of unlimited monetary easing. The inflation target is still set at 2%, but will now be assessed “over time”, a manner of indicating greater tolerance of overshoots. The job mandate will become asymmetric. It aims explicitly to eliminate any shortfalls, but will no longer attenuate any labour market tensions, a decision that de facto disqualifies the Taylor Rule.

THE DIFFICULTY OF MEASURING UNEMPLOYMENT

Presented as the end of a long process of disinflation and the lowering of the neutral rate, this new strategy is also shaped by exceptional circumstances which require the Fed to monetise considerable quantities of public debt. In counterpart, the Fed is creating an unprecedented amount of central bank liquidity, which risks feeding asset bubbles (see chart). Another inconvenience is a loss of precision in forward guidance. In the end, assuming the situation will return to better fortunes, it is hard to see what might trigger a change of course. Monetary policy committee members have just updated their macroeconomic projections, and they do not foresee any rate increases before 2024.

MAGIC MONEY

That year will also mark the end of the 4-year term of the next US president. Who the winner will be is still an open question, and one that risks dominating the headlines well beyond Election Day on 3 November. The most likely winner, at least theoretically, is the Democrat Joe Biden, who has a significant and stable lead in the national polls (50% of voting intentions, compared to 43% for the incumbent Republican, Donald Trump). Yet the results will hinge on a few swing states (which could swing to one candidate or the other). Under the “winner takes all” principle, the candidate that receives the most votes in a state will receive all of that state’s electoral college votes, which are the only votes that count when electing the president. A candidate who receives the most popular votes can still lose the election, as was the case with Hillary Clinton, who had nearly 3 million more popular votes than her rival Donald Trump.

If the results are tight, they are bound to be contested by one of the two parties, a scenario that Donald Trump has already espoused. Mail-in ballots lie at the heart of the upcoming battle: though welcomed in the midst of a health crisis, they risk slowing down the vote counting process. Donald Trump also sees them as a source of fraud, without which his victory is basically assured[6]. If he fails to win the presidential election on 3 November, the current occupant of the White House may well be reluctant to concede.

[1] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (2020), $2.2 of $4 Trillion in Fiscal Relief is Out of the Door, September.

[2] According to estimates by One Fair Wage, a large percentage (44%) of hotel and food service employees who lost their jobs during the pandemic did not have unemployment insurance in May 2020. See CNBC, 2020, “Study finds 44% of US unemployment applicants have been denied or are still waiting”, May 15.

[3] Adults in the 25 and over age group, without a college degree or only a high school diploma.

[4] The Washington Post, 2020, “The awful reason wages appeared to soar in the middle of a pandemic”, May 15.

[5] Food, energy and used car prices are notoriously volatile in the United States. To better understand inflationary trends, the BLS proposes a “core” price index for goods that excludes these three components. Although core inflation rebounded a little in August, it is still on a downward trend: -1.3% at an annualised rate over the six months prior to the latest reckoning.

[6] “The only way we are going to lose this election is if it is rigged [...] That is the only way we can lose this election, so we have to be very vigilant.” D. J. Trump, Wisconsin speech, 18 August 2020.

THE ECONOMISTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THIS ARTICLE

Other articles from the same publication

Global
After the recovery, the questions

After the recovery, the questions

For several weeks now, the improvement in economic data has been slowing down. On the one hand, this loss of momentum is unsurprising as it followed a substantial rebound which could not last [...]

Read the article
China
Households are still worried

Households are still worried

The economy continues to recover. Initially driven by a rebound in industrial production and investment, the recovery broadened over the summer months. Exports have rebounded and activity has also picked up in the services sector [...]

Read the article
Japan
Economic policy continuity

Economic policy continuity

It will take a long time for Japan to erase the economic shock of the Covid-19 pandemic. Even though lockdown measures were less restrictive than in other countries, Japanese GDP is poised for a record contraction in 2020 [...]

Read the article
Eurozone
Running out of breath

Running out of breath

After a more vigorous than expected recovery following the end of lockdown, the trend now seems less energetic [...]

Read the article
Germany
After the virus, the threat of zombies

After the virus, the threat of zombies

A strong rebound is expected in Q3 (7.2%) following the progressive lifting of restrictions. Nevertheless, the recovery is likely to remain slow and bumpy at times, at least until there is a Covid-19 vaccine or a better treatment [...]

Read the article
France
From fast, the return to normal is becoming more asymptotic

From fast, the return to normal is becoming more asymptotic

After a rapid restart in May and June, the economy was back to 95% of its normal level in August [...]

Read the article
Italy
Towards an uncertain recovery

Towards an uncertain recovery

In Q2 2020, real GDP fell by 12.8%, dropping down to values recorded in the 1990s. A weakened domestic demand was the main driver of the recession, with households reducing their expenditure and investment falling by 15% [...]

Read the article
Spain
Fiscal compromises are inevitable

Fiscal compromises are inevitable

The Spanish economy registered a record contraction of 22.7% in the first half of 2020 [...]

Read the article
Netherlands
Sufficiently deep pockets for stimulus

Sufficiently deep pockets for stimulus

Economic activity contracted less than in the neighbouring countries (-8.5%). Hard data confirm a rebound in Q3, although social distancing rules are weighing on activity, in particular in services [...]

Read the article
Belgium
More robust than expected, but new coalition has tough choices to make

More robust than expected, but new coalition has tough choices to make

We expect the Belgian economy to lose 7.5% of its size this year and grow by 4.6% next year. Consumption is on course for a strong recovery but corporates remain hesitant to invest, with government interventions expected to pick up some of the slack [...]

Read the article
Finland
One of the most resilient economies in Europe

One of the most resilient economies in Europe

Finland’s economy was showing signs of weakness even before the Covid-19 pandemic started – indeed, GDP contracted a bit in the fourth quarter of 2019. In spite of that, the economy has been one of the most resilient in Europe [...]

Read the article
Portugal
Some fiscal leeway to support the recovery

Some fiscal leeway to support the recovery

Despite managing well the epidemic, Portugal has experienced a severe economic shock in Q2. Real GDP plunged by 13.9%, pulled down by sharp falls in goods and services exports (-36.1% q/q) and private sector consumption (-14.0% q/q) [...]

Read the article
United Kingdom
Out of the frying pan into the fire?

Out of the frying pan into the fire?

While UK GDP has bounced back since May and has made up half of lost ground caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the economic crisis is still far from being over [...]

Read the article
Norway
Back to growth despite two large shocks

Back to growth despite two large shocks

Not only was Norway affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, but the country also had to face a big fall in the price of its main export: oil [...]

Read the article